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THE TRANSLATION OF MARY MYCROFT.

.................." Surely not in vain
My substance of the common earth was ta'en
And to this figure moulded to be broke
Or trampled back to shapeless earth again."
Omar Khayyam.

SHE had never heard of Sterne's starling with its incessant and hopeless cry of "I can't get out! I can't get out"—but, some such despairing thought voiced itself in her inner consciousness. "She" was a European looking child with fearless hazel eyes, touzled brown hair and, as yet, fair complexion who, in the frame in which she was set, was incompatible with the fitness of things. De Quincey the Opium Eater, in a passage of singular beauty of expression, speaks of the sorrow of a child in its utter loneliness as one of the most pathetic and heartsearing experiences in the world; and Mary—for she had no other name—in being the victim of circumstances she could not understand was experiencing the sadness of childhood. She was nearly seven years old, and growing observation filled her dawning mind with conjectures and inferences which she could not communicate to others. Her isolation from her mother, and her child companions of the hamlet of mud huts in which they lived, grew more pronounced every day she grew older. This isolation robbed the child of half the joy of life. She soon realized that her existence was an anomaly which required explanation. She did not know that her sordid surroundings did not belong to the natural order of things; but she suspected—and the suspicion waxed towards certainty every day—that the woman whom she was so fond of was not her mother, and that she herself was—! at this stage thought failed her. Mary knew of no existence other than the

one she was leading. From infancy she had been there, had clung with affection and love to the comely native woman then seated on the *pial* of a small native house chewing betel contentedly as a cow chews the cud—and whom she called "amma"—mother. The suspicion that the woman was not her mother, the child learnt later, was wrong. Meenachi *was* Mary's mother, and all things considered a good mother. The suspicion was born of the difference in the colour of her own skin and that of her mother's. To the village women Mary was "Dorai's daughter." Who were the *Dorais?* She had asked her mother once or twice but had always received an evasive reply. The fact was, Meenachi was a caste woman and was now kept by a caste man. She regretted the temporary lapse from the path of rectitude which had burdened her with a child to her shame. The temptation held out to her when as a poor girl she fell had been great, but she had in a measure lived it down. She could live it down entirely but for the child—which, after all, she loved in a fashion. Meenachi also had her moments of introspection. Oh! If she could only part with the child. Her *Dorai* had called it Mary when it was born—and she had held to the name heathen though she was. So an estrangement began to shadow itself between Meenachi the Marava mother and Mary the Eurasian child—an estrangement which was more felt than expressed and which ultimately led to Mary's translation to another sphere.

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Percival Mycroft, at the time when little Mary was eating her heart out in loneliness in an Indian village, was a successful tea planter in a range of hills not a thousand miles from it. Coming out as a "creeper," by steady application to work and sterling honesty he had for some years held the place of superintendent in a large estate, when a legacy left by an adoring aunt enabled him to buy a share in the concern. Experience had taught him the gift of silence on many things and not one of his intimate friends ever knew that Percy Mycroft was a Roman Catholic. Planters are generally reticent regarding religion and cant is *taboo,* and so Mycroft never was tempted to make a confession of faith. Divorced from church and condemned to utter loneliness, is it any wonder that, with youth and health and temptation, Mycroft did as scores of others—better circumstanced in every way—do? He formed a temporary connection of which the consequence was Mary in the

mud hamlet in the shimmering plains. When Mycroft perceived the consequences of his mistake he nearly fell into the error of perpetuating it by persistence in a course of life which prudence, religious teaching and worldly wisdom all forbade.

> "Ah take the cash and let the credit go
> Nor heed the rumble of a distant drum"

said a voice—though Mycroft had never read the *Rubaiyat.* "It is a shame to wash your hands of the affair and leave the child to its fate" said parental affection and religious teaching. "Oh, it would never do!" said his chum Dicky Smith. "There 'll be the devil to pay when it's known in Tomtompore"—and the Devil prevailed once again and Meenachi was pecuniarily provided for by way of compensation and Mary was banished to the plains, never to return, with her mother. When this arrangement was concluded Dicky Smith returned to the attack and said "Now Mycroft, you're not cut out for a bachelor! You're too damned sentimental. Fancy wanting to—to—to—ruin yourself for life on account of—Pah! You just take a run Home and there's many a nice girl there, let me tell you —clean and wholesome and good—who'll be glad to be Mrs. Percy" and Dicky Smith vigorously struck his gaitered understandings with his riding whip till he set all the dogs in the house barking.

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It was Easter week in the Christian world; and even in the remote little hamlet where Meenachi lived, a little Roman Catholic chapel lay huddled with some huts belonging to the low class Pallars and Pariahs. Usually services were conducted every week by the sexton, and Father Bernard from Tinnevelly would, once in three months and on important days, either come himself or depute a brother priest to minister to the necessities of the small congregation. This Easter, Father Bernard came himself and on the Saturday preceding Easter Sunday, the good father knowing of Mary and her mother—and it is really remarkable how intimate the Roman Catholic Missionary in touch with his own congregation is with the gossip of the villages over which he has spiritual control—took an evening walk in that direction. The sun was setting fast and threw a flood of orange light on the paddy fields stretching away to the east. The hills to the north were already in shadow, and the bluish tinge so characteristic of the evening air on clear days formed a contrast to the golden gleams of the declining luminary. As the Priest approached Meenachi's house, he

saw Mary seated under an immense tamarind tree, dressed in a little skirt, with body exposed and hair in a plait. She and two other native urchins were playing with tamarind seeds and were quite absorbed in the pastime. Father Bernard stood still and watched, and a feeling of pity surged up in his heart to see this child so neglected. A squirrel noticed the figure in the terracotta robe and uttered a quick-quick of alarm. A drowzy crow responded with a lazy caw. The village Pariah dogs howled from a respectable distance and the sound attracted the notice of Meenachi who peeped from her tiny verandah and called hastily to the child to enter the house. Undeterred by this Father Bernard, who was accompanied by a native sexton, sat himself on Meenachi's *pial* and drew Mary who was standing and staring at him in bewilderment towards him. He smoothed her hair and asked her what her name was. "Was this a *Dorai*" the girl asked herself. "Her mother addressed him as *Samy* as if he were a Brahmin. Yet she was not afraid. He was fair like herself and could he be her father whom the village called *Dorai*. No, that was not likely. She had heard of a *Samy* who used to come to the Catholic chapel. She had never been there herself." All these thoughts flashed through Mary's mind! Standing close to the kindly priest she examined him with curious eyes and listened, without fully understanding, to the conversation between him and her mother. When Father Bernard left at dusk he had succeeded in getting a promise from Meenachi to relinquish the child to the care of the Convent at Tomtompoor, and for this the good Priest's pocket would have to pay a handsome donation. Meenachi only wanted some jewels to get her man to marry her and the price of her child furnished her with what she desired.

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The Nuns of the Convent were very busy indeed. It was the Annual Week in Tomtompoor and the prize destribution and fancy fair of the convent school was fixed to take place at the same time. Mr. and Mrs. Mycroft—for Mycroft had taken Smith's advice,—had left the Estate for a short holiday, to take part in the annual club dinner, to see His Highness the Rajah, to witness the *Aurat* procession and to perform their religious rites—for they were good Catholics. Visited by the parish Priest, Father Ambrose they were invited to the Prize distribution and they attended it—utterly blind to what awaited them there.

Mycroft had often thought of his little waif, but apprehensive that his wife would come to know of this page in his life he forbore making any enquiries and after a lapse of fifteen years had nearly forgotten it altogether. Before the prizes were delivered some action songs and tableaus were exhibited and Mary, now a tall handsome girl of sixteen, took a prominent part in one of the scenes. "Percy," whispered Mrs. Mycroft suddenly—"Do you see that pretty girl there? What a striking resemblance she bears to you!"—and his wife directed his attention to Mary as she gazed from the stage on to the audience. "Pooh! nonsense—dear," Mycroft said. "What an idea! I don't think so at all"—But nevertheless he kept his eyes on the girl and during the fancy fair he had further opportunities of watching her, for she pinned a button hole on to his coat and he grew sick with apprehension. He could scarcely formulate the idea. "Could it be his child? How did she get there? What if his wife came to know?" His mind was tortured with the thoughts, and pleading fatigue, he managed to get his wife to leave early. But she was infatuated! Childless herself she had long cherished the idea of adopting some one else's child. Why not this one? It was true she was sixteen, but the nuns had trained her well, apparently, and she herself had had only a Convent training. Mycroft told her she was demented, but ultimately permitted her to see the nuns. The nuns could give her no information. The child was called Mary and was christened after her admission to the school as Mary Magrah, as Father Bernard of the Tinnevelly Mission wished. Further information could be got only from him. Mrs. Mycroft went to Tinnevelly and saw Father Bernard, now an old man and in failing health. Yes, he remembered the child and had supported her all these years. She was the daughter of a native woman in a small hamlet near the hills—and her father was a planter named, it was alleged, Magrah. That was the way the mother of the child pronounced it, and he would be glad to surrender the child if the lady meant well by her.

Magrah! Magrah! thought Mrs. Mycroft; certainly no one of that name had ever been a planter in the Tomtompore hills. As she considered, a sudden feeling that she was on the trail of a discovery made her heart beat. Yes, since her arrival she had heard of such connections. Could Percy have ever! Magrah! That was the way the natives pronounced Mycroft. She felt she hated this child—this

—this—! Thoughts crowded on her. Could Percy—? To be sure the girl—How like she was to her husband—and as she thought and thought—! the tears filled in her eyes. Father Bernard saw that some extraordinary emotion was agitating his visitor, and as he looked at the name on the card lying on his table, in a flash, the situation became plain. Devoutly crossing himself he said :—" Don't cry my daughter. It is the hand of God. The Almighty Father has chosen you to right a grievous wrong—to do justice to a helpless child. I do not know Mary's father, but if he is related to you, and from your emotion I gather as much, I am sure you will see her restored to her rights. She is a very good girl."

Mrs. Mycroft took leave of Father Bernard after receiving his blessing, and promising to see him again but making no engagement. It was a long journey to her husband's estate, but she got there at last--and then—? Then was made one of those painful confessions which in India are perhaps more often made than in any other country in the world—and the end of it was that Mary Mycroft soon after left India for England with her adoptive mother. Five years later she was married to an English gentleman of means, and one of her little ones, called Mary, is the light and life of Mycroft and his wife in their advancing years.

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"These things are on the knees of the gods"!—But for one such exception, there are thousands of children, the victims of circumstances over which they have no control—starving, neglected, uneducated, forlorn. Their fathers are ashamed of them and only too often help to fling the stones of calumny and prejudice against a class for which they are chiefly responsible. Christian England sends out Missions to the "Heathen" into whose wounds of ignorance, sloth and sin the oil of compassion is poured with no stinted hand. To children like Mary Mycroft, Protestant England sends no special mission, and the children's bread is withheld from them. The Roman Church, wise in her organization and Catholic in her Charity, is the one agency that has steadfastly done her duty in this connection. God bless her efforts—and may her example stimulate Protestant Missions to take a hand in the good work and to raise a community which, if cared for and sympathised with, possesses potentialities as great as any "heathen" community in India.

A. P. SMITH.

ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHISM.

XIII—PALINGENESIS.

Karmaphala.

WHEN deeds are done, the doing passes away, but what is accomplished by them abides; just as when a man has written a letter, the writing has ceased but the letter remains. So also when the *skandhas* dissolve, the deeds remain to bear fruit in the future. Though the deeds bear fruit, still there is only a continuance of character, the real personality, beyond the dissolution of the body and mind in death. When a lamp is lit at a burning lamp, there is a kindling of the wick, but no transmigration of the flame. The mango that is planted rots in the ground, but it is reborn in the mangoes of the tree that grows from its seed. From the seed to the fruit there is no transmigration of a mango soul, but there is a reconstruction of its form, and the type in all its individual features is preserved in the new mangoes. Similarly, when a boy learns a verse from his teacher, the verse is reincarnated in the boy's mind, but there is no transmigration of the verse in the ordinary literal meaning of that word. So man reincarnates, and his peculiar *karma* is born in new individuals. "What is reborn is name and form. But it is not the same name and form. By one name and form deeds are done, and by these deeds another name and form is reborn. One name and form finds its end in death, another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds"[1] "Those groups which came into being in the past existence in dependence on *Karma*, perished then and there. But in dependence on the *Karma* of that existence other groups have come into being in this existence. Not a single element of being has come into this existence from a previous one.[2] The groups which have come into being in this existence in dependence on *Karma* will perish, and others will come into being in the next existence, but not a single element of being will go from this existence into the next. Moreover, just as the words of the teacher do not pass over into the mouth of the pupil who, nevertheless, repeats them; and just as tne features of the face

1. *Milindaprasna.*

2. *Na kas chid dharmosmallokat paralokam gacchati—Pitaputrasamagame* quoted in Prajnakara's commentary on the *Bodhicharyavatara.*

do not pass to the reflection in mirrors and the like and nevertheless in dependence on them does the image appear; and just as the flame does not pass over from the wick of one lamp to that of another and nevertheless the flame of the second lamp exists in dependence on that of the former; in exactly the same way not a single element of being passes over from a previous existence into the present existence, nor hence into the next existence; and yet in dependence on the groups, organs of sense, objects of sense, and sense-consciousness of the last existence were born those of this one, and from the present groups, organs of sense, objects of sense, and sense-consciousness will be born the groups, organs of sense, objects of sense, and sense-consciousness of the next existence."[3] Similarly says the *Bodhicharyavatara*:[4] "*Aham eva tadapiti mithyayam parikalpana; anyaeva mrito yasmad anya eva prajayate.* That I am always the same person is a pure illusion. It is one that dies; it is another that is born."[5]

A particular man is not a discrete individual, but a converging centre of physical and psychical activities, of *samskaras* which have been impressed into him by heredity, example and education. It is by a process of evolution that *samskaras* come to be. There is no *samskara* which has come into being without a gradual becoming. The whole history of the development of an individual as observed in a higher organised animal is a continuous chain of reminiscences of the evolution of all those beings which form the ancestral series of that particular animal. The history of no individual begins with his birth, but has been endless ages in the making. The assumption that each human being starts life for himself and commences a development of his own, as if thousands of generations before had been in existence in vain is in striking discord with the facts of daily experience. As Francis Galton ssys, " we must not permit ourselves

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3. Buddhagosha's Vissuddhi Marga (Warren's translation).

4. Chapter VIII, 98.

5. Here and there in the Pitakas may be found passages which appear to suggest that the Buddha admitted the migration of an actual entity from one birth to another. But the fact that such statements occur in the popular discourses and in the parables (the *Jataka* tales) shows that the Blessed One was there speaking from the point of view of the ordinary man. In these popular discourses and parables the aim of the Master was to teach ordinary people in a simple way the truth of the relation between action and its fruit. But, as Pragnakaramati points out in his commentary on the 73rd verse of the *Bodhicharyavatara*, IX, the Blessed One never wanted to imply that one and the same person is reborn.

to consider each human or other personality as something supernaturally added to the stock of nature, but rather as a segregation of what already existed under a new shape and as a regular consequence of new conditions. Neither must we be misled by the word 'individuality'. We may look upon each individual as something not wholly detached from its parent source—as a wave that has been lifted and shaped by normal conditions in an unknown and illimitable ocean." The great Roman poet Lucretius has given utterance to the same thought in the following striking lines:—

> "Not from the blank inane emerged the soul:
> A sacred treasury it is of dreams
> And deeds that built the present from the past,
> Adding thereto its own experiences.
> Ancestral lives are seeing in mine eyes,
> Their hearing listeneth within mine ears,
> And in my hand their strength is plied again.
> Speech came, a rich consignment from the past,
> Each word aglow with wondrous spirit life,
> Thus building up my soul of myriad souls."

No human being can completely sever himself from other human beings. Human beings form constituent units of society, not only by reason of the interdependence of their divers external functions, but also, and more radically still, by reason of their mental interdependence. Man cannot isolate his mental life from that of his fellow-men. His psychic life cannot even awaken without the psychic life of his fellow-men. Even when alone he is not wholly left to himself. He is ever subject to the influence of the community of which he is a member. He can sever his connection with one circle of men only by joining another. Even a hermit is not alone. He lives psychically in a union, conceived in his mind but none the less real, with an ideal society (of his gods, of his saints) which is formed after the model of real society. Indeed, it is exclusively through psychical interdependence that human minds depend upon one another for their very existence as such and for the possible efficiency of their functions; it is through this mutual dependence of their minds upon one another that men are civilized, social and ethical beings.

The belief in a substantial soul is a veritable hindrance to a correct understanding of mental life. He who regards independence of substance as a barrier between centres of psychic life can never come to recognise a mental life reaching beyond the individual,

although its results are evident in all that man does in his association with his fellow-men—in language, science, art, religion and morals. Since men are physically separated from one another, it does not follow that they are also psychically separate from one another. The psychical life continues beyond each individual, because its real subjects are not individuals as such but the bonds uniting individuals. In the process of evolution the continuity of thought *(chittasamtana)* remains unbroken, like an extinct flame that has kindled another. It is the oneness arising from the continuity of thought that determines the connection between the doer of a deed and the enjoyer of its fruit. As the *Bodhicharyavatara* says, "*hetuman phalayogiti drisyate naisha sambhavah, samtanasyaikyam asritya karta bhoktety desitam.* There exists no reason why the doer of a deed should necessarily enjoy its fruit. The oneness arising from the continuity of thought alone determines the connection between the doer of a deed and the enjoyer of its fruit." It is thus the individual is preserved in new forms—*na cha so, na cha anno.*

> Say not 'I am,' 'I was,' or 'I shall be';
> Think not ye pass from house to house of flesh
> Like travellers who remember and forget
> Ill-lodged or well lodged. Fresh
> Issues upon the Universe that sum
> Which is the lattermost of lives—*Light of Asia*, Book VIII.

All creatures are such as they are through past *samskaras*, and when they die their deeds shape new beings. In the slow process of evolution activities shape new personalities. What is called the person is but the living embodiment of past activities, physical and psychical. Past activities impress upon creatures the nature of their present existence. This is the law of palingenesis (*karmaphala*), the law of cause and effect in the psychic world. "There are no creators nor created; nor are men real beings. It is actions and causes that, under favourable conditions, give birth to them. For men are nothing more than the temporary combination of five 'skandhas,' or constituents. The beginning of this combination is their birth; its decomposition their death. During the continuation of this combined state, good and bad actions are done, seeds of future happiness and pain are sown, and thus the alternation of birth and death goes on without end. Men are no real beings that wander between birth and death by themselves, nor is there any ruler that makes them do this, but it is their own actions that bring about

these results. The aggregate actions of all sentient beings give birth to the varieties of mountains, rivers, countries etc. They are caused by aggregate actions, and so they are called 'adhipati phala' (aggregate fruits). As those who are virtuous in their heart are never wicked in their countenance, and as in the countries where good customs prevail, good omens appear, and where people are wicked, calamities arise, so men's aggregate actions bring forth their aggregate fruits. By the particular actions of individuals, each man receives mind and body corresponding to the causes at work, internal causes of actions being favoured by external conditions. And as these good and bad actions yield fruits, not when they are done, but at some future time; so they are called 'vipakaphala' (fruits that ripen at some future time). The period from birth to death in which the body continues, is the life of man; and that from formation to destruction in which they assume similar forms, is the duration of countries, mountains, rivers, etc. The death of sentient beings as well as the formation and destruction of countries, mountains, rivers, etc., are endless in their operation. Like the circle which has no end, they also have neither beginning nor end. Though there exist neither real men nor real things, yet effects appear and disappear where actions are accompanied with conditions, just as the echo follows the sound; and all things, rough or fine, large or small, come and go every moment without any fixed forms. Men and things, therefore, are mere names for durations in which similar forms continue. Our present life is the reflection of past actions. Men consider these reflections as their real selves. Their eyes, noses, ears, tongues, and bodies, as well as their gardens, woods, farms, residences, servants, and maids, men imagine to be their own possessions; but in fact, they are but results endlessly produced by innumerable actions."[6]

The same truth is expressed by a well-known living writer as follows:—"Do we then live after death? Of course we do. We *live*. Our bodies dissolve, but our lives continue. What is *we*? And what is *to live*? If to live is to eat and drink, to feel joy and pain, to be conscious of action and thought, we cannot affirm anything about a state which, so far as we can see, supposes the absence of a nervous system. For my part, I do not pretend to know what consciousness can be in the absence of a nervous system, for I mean

6. Kuroda: Outlines of Mahayana, p. 9.

by consciousness an organic state relative to a nervous system. And so far as *we* means this state of consciousness, I have no means of forming a rational opinion on the question.

"Happily *we* are not nervous systems. Life is not an agitation of the nervous system. We act, we work, we teach, we inspire love in places where we are not, where we have never been, and in souls which we have not seen in the body. We are not as the beasts that perish. And the social nature of man is not bestial. The soul of man has a subtle faculty of incorporating itself with the souls of our fellow-men. We are immortal by virtue of the intricate organism of which we are part. Nervous system, digestive apparatus, and locomotive organs are essential as a basis of life but in due course that life can be practically continued by the agency of other bodies than those in which it begins. It cannot be continued, so far as we can see, without other like bodies, natures and souls, such as ours, and therefore not in Dante's and Milton's paradise. The organism, man and woman, is mortal truly; but the organism, Humanity, is immortal. We know of nothing that can destroy it within the conditions of our solar sphere.

"A good life in the flesh becomes thus incorporated with the mighty organism, and becomes immortal with it. Not an act of ours, not a look, nor a thought, is utterly lost and wasted in space. For good or for evil it forms us, and our character and our work. It forms some other brother or sister near us for good or for bad. If it be strong and noble, it shapes many. It it be weak and evil, it is gradually expunged. It may not be remembered, not recorded and not distinguished. But it continues, eternally pulsating unknown through generations of Humanity. It may be a drop in the ocean of human life. But as surely as every drop which falls on an Alp will pass on ultimately into the ocean, so every human life, every act of life, every kind word, every good deed, every clear thought, lives in the life to come. We live, and we live for ever, the greatest and the feeblest. We do not continue to have nervous sensations; we do not eat and drink; we do not think or act, it may be, and we do not add to our work on earth. But *we live*. Our lives remain here and continue our work. The humanity which nursed us as infants, trained us as children, and shaped our lives as men, prolongs that life in a collective eternity, when it has closed our eyes with reverent sorrow, and said in hope and love the last words over our bones. And it makes us as immortal as itself."

Death is dissolution, but the man who dies continues to live in his deeds. Our deeds, as George Elliot says, are like the children born to us; they live and act apart from our own will. Nay, children may be strangled, but deeds never. Wherever a man's words, thoughts, deeds have impressed themselves in other minds, there he has reincarnated. He that has no clear idea of death and does not master the fact that death everywhere consists in the dissolution of the groups (*skandhas*), comes, as Buddhagosha says, to a variety of conclusions, such as 'A living entity dies and transmigrates into another body'; and, similarly, he that has no clear idea of rebirth and does not master the fact that the appearance of the groups (*skandhas*) everywhere constitutes birth, he comes to a variety of conclusions, such as, 'A living entity is born and has obtained a new body.' There is not a being that is born, acts, enjoys itself, suffers and dies, and is reborn to die again, but simply birth, action, enjoyment, suffering and death take place. The life-activities, the deeds alone are real; and these are preserved and nothing else. Therefore has it been said:—

"No doer is there does the deed,
Nor is there one who feels the fruit;
Constituent parts alone roll on;
This view alone is orthodox.

"And thus the deed, and thus the fruit
Roll on and on, each from its cause;
As of the round of tree and seed,
No one can tell when they began.

"Nor is the time to be perceived.
In future births when they shall cease.
The heretics perceive not this
And fail of mastery o'er themselves.

"'An ego,' say they, 'doth exist,
Eternal, or that soon will cease';
Thus two-and-sixty heresies
They 'mongst themselves discordant hold.

"Bound in the bonds of heresy,
By passion's flood they 're borne along;
And borne along by passion's flood,
From misery find they no release.

"If once these facts he but perceive,
A man whose faith on Buddha rests
The subtle deep, and self-devoid
Dependence will then penetrate.

"Not in its fruit is found the deed,
Nor in the deed finds one the fruit;
Of each the other is devoid,
Yet there is no fruit without the deed.

"Just as no store of fire is found
In jewel, cowdung, or the sun,

Nor separate from these exists,
Yet short of fuel no fire is known ;

"Even so we ne'er within the deed
Can retribution's fruit descry,
Nor yet in any place without ;
Nor can in fruit the deed be found.

"Deeds separate from their fruits exist
And fruits are separate from the deeds ;
But consequent upon the deed
The fruit doth into being come.

"No god of heaven or Brahma-world
Doth cause the endless round of birth ;
Constituent parts alone roll on
From cause and material sprung."

XIV.—CAUSAL NEXUS.

Pratitya Samutpada.

"*Karmajam lokavaichitryam.*" All things are born of activities. Everything is in a state of continual transformation. *Na cha niro dhosti na cha bhavosti sarvada : ajatam aniruddham cha tasmad sarvam idam jagat.*" There is neither creation nor destruction : there is neither beginning nor end. Yet nothing happens without cause and reason. "*Vicharena nasti kim chid ahetutah.*"

Every change is determined by a number of circumstances. The most striking of these circumstances is generally called its cause and the change itself is said to be the effect of that cause. Strictly speaking the cause (*pratyaya*) of any change is the totality of all the circumstances required for its occurrence. That in the cause which makes the effect possible is spoken of as the reason (*hetu*) of the change. When a seed changes into a plant, that in the seed which makes it become a plant of a particular kind is the reason of the change, while the totality of conditions, such as the soil, water, light, air, space, needed for its germination and growth, constitutes the cause. Similarly sentiency, the germ of consciousness (*vijnana bijam*), is the reason for the development of individuality (*namarupa*), while the union of parents, the womb of the mother, the potentialities derived from parents, vegetative and animal activities, and the environment constitute the causes that produce a particular individuality.

No change occurs by itself. Every change stands in the relation of cause to some other change, and in the relation of an effect to a third change. All changes in the world depend more or less upon one another. This causal nexus, which is found everywhere in experience, is called in the Dharma by the technical name of *pratitya*

samutpada.[7] A correct understanding of this casual nexus, of the conditioned nature of all existence, which has neither beginning nor end, is all important in Buddhism. *Pratitya samutpadam pasyanti te dharmam pasyanti; yo dharmam pasyati sa buddham pasyati.* He who has understood the chain of causation has understood the inner meaning of the Dharma, and he that has grasped the Dharma has perceived the essence of Buddhahood.

If every change has a cause, and that cause, agian a cause, is there then no ultimate unchangeable or first cause? In experience we find no absolute beginning, we come across no change instituting a series of changes, which has not itself been preceded by some other change. The question of cause never even arises except where there is change, and the cause demanded is always another change. Hence it is meaningless to speak of a first cause. Science knows nothing of first causes. There is no branch of scientific investigation from which they can be inferred. Wherever we find their existence asserted, we find that we have reached a permanent or temporary limit to knowledge, or that we are inferring something outside the limits of sense experience, where knowledge and inference are meaningless. "A first cause with which as a creative act the series of changes should have begun originally, would be an uncaused change. The necessity of conceiving every change as effect which has its cause in a preceding change, makes such an uncaused change absolutely unthinkable."

Is there then no Isvara or God? If the world had been made by Isvara, there should be no change and destruction, there should be no such thing as sorrow or calamity, as right or wrong, for all things, pure and impure, must come from him. If sorrow and joy, love and hate, which spring up in all conscious beings, be the work of Isvara, he himself must be capable of sorrow and joy, love and hate, and if he has these, how can he be said to be perfect? If Isvara be the maker, and if all beings have to submit silently to their maker's power, what would be the utility of practising virtue? The doing of right or wrong would be the same, as all deeds are his making and must be the same with their maker. But if sorrow and

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7. There are two applications of "*pratitya samutpada*: *bahya*" (objective) and "*adhyatmika*" (subjective). Each again is subdivided into two: "*hetopanibandana*" (limited by reasons) and "*pratyaopanibandana*" (limited by causes).

suffering are attributed to another cause, then there would be something of which Isvara is not the cause. Why, then, should not all that exists be uncaused too? Again, if Isvara be the maker, he acts with or without a purpose. If he acts with a purpose, he cannot be said to be all perfect, for a purpose necessarily implies the satisfaction of a want. If he acts without a purpose, he must be like the lunatic or the suckling babe. Besides, if Isvara be the maker, why should not people reverently submit to him, why should they offer supplications to him when sorely pressed by necessity? And why should they adore more than one Isvara?

Is not the world in which we live an orderly world where everything is governed by law? Do not laws imply a law giver? All the order which exists in the world arises from the simple fact that, when there are no disturbing causes, things remain the same. The observed grouping of things and sequence of events we speak of as the order of the world, which is the same as saying that the world is as it is and no more. Every law of nature merely describes the conditions on which a particular change is dependent. No natural law is the cause of the order in nature. A body falls to the ground not in consequence of the law of gravitation, but the law of gravitation is the precise statement of what happens when a body is left unsupported. A natural law does not command that something shall take place, but it merely states how something happens. When a law has been found to be true in all known cases, we naturally expect that it would apply to cases that might hereafter come to our knowledge. The greater the number of cases in which a law has been observed to hold good, the greater is the probability that it is universally true. If the sun has risen daily without fail during the last 5000 years (=1826213 days), the odds in favour of its rising to-morrow are 1826214 to 1, and this amounts to saying that the rising of the sun to-morrow is practically certain. It is only in this sense that we speak of the uniformity of nature. We can only say that the laws of nature are practically universal but not theoretically so. This practical certainty is all that we are capable of obtaining, and is enough to serve as a guide in life. Theoretical certainty would imply perfect and infinite knowledge, but this evidently is beyond man's capacities. All attempts at extrapolation far beyond the region of experience, whether it be in space or in time, must be affected with the greatest insecurity, for the probability of the results is *nil*.

Because the facts of this world can be summarily described by laws, because the world is such as we know it to be, does it follow that the world has been designed by Isvara? Because one finds a wound on his body, does it follow that it had been inflicted by an invisible ghost with an invisible sword? All that we could infer from the condition of the world is that there must be a cause. But the necessity of thought which compels us to affirm that the world had a cause compels us to postulate a cause of that cause, and so on *ad infinitum*, a first cause being, as we have already seen, even unthinkable. Further this so-called teleological or design argument involves a vicious circle. To explain certain observed relations between the parts of organisms, the so-called design, the idea of God is first introduced, and such natural design is then again employed to prove the existence of God, a procedure which surely is not consistent. Moreover, the concept of end or purpose is, as Kant has pointed out, not a principle of the knowledge of nature, but a mode in which the human mind judges of certain organic forms. Man thinks the organising character of nature as analogous to causality aiming at ends, but this cannot be presumed to offer an explanation of it. So the end is not the principle according to which these organic forms have been created, but merely a point of view which arises from our reflection about them. Properly speaking teleology belongs "only to the description of nature; it gives us no valid conclusion as to the origin and inner possiblity of organic forms." If one should ask, as Coleridge did, whether material bodies could apply geometrical calculations to themselves, if material bodies could be the joint artists of their own combinations, we can only answer: under such and such conditions they do behave in such and such a way. Beyond this we know nothing. Further we may call to mind the words of the sceptical Philo: "Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen that if we could penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition."

If the heavens above do not declare the glory of God, does not the moral law within derive its sanction from the belief that Isvara has ordained it, and that he will distribute to men, according to their deeds, rewards and punishments in a life beyond the grave? No doubt the observance of the laws of morality is of supreme

importance to mankind, but it has nothing to do either with a belief in a future life or in Isvara. He who thinks that the world would be a worthless place without immortality is on the same level as the child who thinks that "grown up" life to be worth having, must be a life of continual play and no work. Nor can he be called truly moral who does not think it worth his while to be virtuous, unless he can look forward to remuneration hereafter for not having lived like a beast.

As for the belief in God, what connection can it have with morality? Morality has sprung from those human relationships in which the individual finds himself compelled to live and act. It has its roots in the individual's needs, both physical and mental, which other human beings can satisfy and in the sympathies which answer to those needs. That man should be truthful, just, merciful, loving and kind to his neighbours, that he should practise virtue and avoid vice, are injunctions which obtain their validity, not because there is Isvara, but because human society would become impossible if they were set at nought. On the other hand, the observance of these laws produces the highest, most durable and most widely spread forms of human bliss. Only a monster or a savage will dare to say that, if there be no Isvara, it is right or permissible for any man, apart from the terrors of civil law, to commit murder, theft and adultery as freely as he pleases. On the other hand the moral character of Isvara varies with the ethical standards of his worshippers. As man advances to higher stages of morality his earlier conceptions of the moral character of Isvara no longer satisfy him and are accordingly criticised and reconstructed to meet the demands of his new ideals. The history of religious thought proves this beyond doubt. Hence instead of saying that Isvara is the creator, we ought to say that man has created his idea of Isvara, including its moral elements. As Xenophanes has said, if lions could have pictured a god, they would have pictured him in the form of a lion; the horses like a horse; the oxen like an ox. "An honest god is the noblest work of man."*

How can we deny the existence of God, when most people who have existed heretofore have believed in a god of some sort? When we examine this argument *ex consensu gentium*, we easily see its

* "The religious mind could express its relations to God in no other way but by attributing to him a nature similar to its own"—Hastings' Bible Dictionary: article on God.

hollowness. Granting that God's existence is a matter of general belief, does it establish any probability that God exists? It cannot, for many things, now admitted to be errors, have in the past been matters of general belief. Such, for example, is the belief that the sun went round the earth. Ignorance of science and fallacious reasoning have in the past been the main props of the belief in God. With the growth of scientific knowledge and the recognition of the fallacies underlying natural theology the belief in God is becoming less general. Again, though there might be a wide-spread belief in God, God does not mean the same thing for all. Just consider the phases through which the idea of God has passed in the development of such a small people as the Jews. The God of Samuel orders the slaughter of infants, but the tender mercies of the God of the Psalmist are over all his works. The God of the Patriarchs is always repenting, while the God of the Apostles is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever without any variableness or shadow of turning. The God the Old Testament walks in the garden in the cool of the day, but the God of the New Testament cannot be seen by man. The God of Leviticus is punctilious about the sacrificial furniture and utensils, but the God of the Acts cannot dwell in temples. The God of Exodus is merciful only to those who love him, whereas the God of Jesus is kind unto the unthankful and the evil. Not only has the idea of God been different at different times with one and the same people, but it has never been the same for any two persons. No wonder that Wesley told Whitefield: "Your god is my devil." Temperament, training, surroundings are determinative factors in an individual's idea of God. At best the argument from general belief can only prove that in worshipping God a man only yearns towards his utmost possible conception as regards the unknown. This is well illustrated by the fact that the most ignorant of mankind have the most concrete idea of God, who is to them one like themselves, with immensely magnified powers, whereas the more cultured a man is and the more facts he knows, the less definite is his idea of God. While the savage sees his gods in stocks and stones, the philosopher considers a god comprehended as no god.

The so-called historical proofs for the existence of God are from their very nature fallacious. What they attempt to establish is the existence of miracles. If by a miracle is meant an event which had no natural cause, history cannot accept such events. For all

historical evidence rests on inferences from effect to cause, and we can infer from effect to cause only on the assumption that we can find the complete causes of events in the course of nature. If miracles were possible, we should never be able to say that a particular thing was the cause of any other. Hence no historical proof can by any possibility show that an event, which happened, was in reality a miracle. But if by miracle is meant only a great and wonderful work, then a man's ability to perform astonishing feats does not prove that he knows the truth or tells it. Apart from miracles historical proofs can only show that somebody said something but they cannot establish the truth of his statements, which has to be tested on quite other grounds. Hence neither history nor science can apodeictically establish the existenee of God. As Professor James says in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, all arguments for God but follow "the combined suggestions of the facts and of our feeling. They prove nothing rigorously. They only corroborate our pre-existent partialities...... If you have a god already whom you believe in, these arguments confirm you. If you are atheistic, they fail to set you right." Similarly says Kant: "I cannot, indeed, agree with the opinion to which some excellent and thoughtful men, even while fully conscious of the weakness of all the arguments hitherto relied on, have often given expression, that we may hope some day to discover demonstrative proof of the two cardinal principles of pure reason (?) that there is a god and a future life; on the contrary, I am satisfied that nothing of the kind will ever be attained."

If the world has not been created by Isvara, may not all existence be a manifestation of the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Unknowable behind all appearances? If by the Absolute is meant something out of relation to all known things, its existence cannot be established by any reasoning. How can we know that any thing unrelated to other things exists at all? The whole universe, as we know it, is a system of relations; we know nothing that is, or can be, unrelated. How can that which depends on nothing and is related to nothing produce things which are related to one another and depend for their existence on one another? Again, the Absolute is either one or many. If it be only one, how can it be the cause of the different things which originate, as we know, from different causes? If there be as many different absolutes as there are things,

how can the latter be related to one another? If the Absolute pervades all things and fills all space, then it cannot also make them, for there is nothing to make. Further if the Absolute is devoid of all qualities (*nirguna*), all things arising from it ought likewise to be devoid of qualities. But in reality all things in the world are circumscribed throughout by qualities. Hence the Absolute cannot be the cause. If the Absolute is considered to be different from the qualities, how does it continually create the things possessing such qualities and manifest itself in them? Again, if the Absolute be unchangeable; all things should be unchangeable too, for the effect cannot differ in nature from the cause. But all things in the world undergo change and decay. How then can the Absolute be unchangeable? Moreover, if the Absolute which pervades all is the cause of everything, why should we seek liberation? We ourselves possess this Absolute and must patiently endure every suffering and sorrow, as the Absolute will always be creating all kind of evil.

The Absolute owes its origin to the erroneous assumption that every concept has a distinct counterpart in reality, and that the higher concepts exist prior to the lower concepts, and contain the latter by implication in them. A simple reference to the process of conception reveals the absurdity of this assumption. In our experience there is nothing more original than sensation. What we speak of as reality is connected with sensation. We know that sensations arise, but we can form no idea of how they arise, as every idea has sensations for its content and its presupposition. A primary datum of sensation is the consciousness of difference. Without this no act of sensation would even be possible. The recognition of identity amid difference is the basis of all discursive or ratiocinative thought. While we perceive objects as different, we conceive them as identical by directing our attention to their points of agreement. Thus objects are classified into groups, those attributes which belong to the objects in common serving as the basis of classifiation. When the number of objects to be classified is large, and some of them have more attributes in common than others, they are arranged in a series of groups. First all those objects which have the greatest number of attributes in common, are grouped so as to form what is called a species; the species are then collected and distributed into a higher group or genus having a small number of common attributes,

and so forth. The totality of attributes pertaining to a class is termed a *concept*. Thus out of complexes of sensations which constitute reality, we build up in thought our concepts. By the omission or rejection of the differentiating attributes and by ideally conjoining the common characters, we form the higher or more extensive concepts, from the lower or less extensive ones. There is nothing in this process of abstraction from which it can be inferred that the rejected attributes are contained or implied in those that are retained and combined to form the higher concepts. It is this error of regarding the higher concepts as giving birth to the lower concepts, coupled with the fancy that the highest concepts, such as existence, being, substance, matter, energy, consciousness, which include the attributes common to all things, form the invariable substrata of the variable characters by which things are distinguished from one another, that has been the prolific mother of metaphysical speculation concerning the unknown. For subjective reasons man is inclined to overestimate the value of the unknown and prefer it to the known. His practical dissatisfaction with reality, that is to say, with the senseworld, has inspired, him to invent a metaphysical supra-sensible reality. Out of what is abstracted from sense experience, out of what is really less than the deliverance of the senses, the metaphysician constructs a transcendent existence. "For," as Kant says, "when the explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation which lifts us above the necessity of investigating Nature." And feeling himself unable to clutch his fanciful creation, the metaphysician employs fantastic means to realise his vain hopes.

In different ages and climes different methods have been employed to get into touch with the transcendental or supernatuaral. These methods may be roughly grouped into three principal classes. The first class comprises all those cases in which some supernatural being, whether it be God, his messenger, or some angel or demon, appears before the favoured person, and reveals directly, by visible signs or articulate sounds, what he was elected to reveal. In the second are included those cases in which an individual is mysteriously possessed and overpowered by some supernatural agent, who makes revelations through the obsessed individual. The chief feature of the third class is the condition of trance or ecstacy, in

which the subject withdrawn from things of sense, enters into direct connection with God, or the Absolute, or other spiritual agencies, and discerns the transcendental truths of a world which is inaccessible to the ordinary means of apprehension by sense and understanding. For the cultured man of modern civilized countries the first two methods appear too crude for acceptance. But the third, the method of ecstatic intuition, still finds favour with many, and in recent times attempts have even been made to prop it up by some new psychological discoveries.

What is this ecstatic intuition? It is the abstraction of the mind from the body in order to enter into direct communion with God, overcoming the ordinary limitations of individuality, and become one with the Brahman or Absolute. The mode of operation is generally as follows: By prolonged and intense concentration of thought into one channel, the concentration being often aided by fixing the gaze on a particular object, the suitably disposed mind is eventually thrown into a state in which sense and reason are suspended, individual consciousness is lost in a transport, which is felt as an absorption into the infinite, and the enraptured subject learns by immediate intuition ineffable truths which could never have been found by the slow steps of discursive reason. Like the drunken consciousness and other forms of the so-called mystic consciousness, ecstatic intuition also possesses the four characteristics of ineffability, transient duration, a sense of passivity and a transcendent insight. But between this method and the first two methods there is no essential fundamental difference. In both cases certain extraordinary conditions of the organism, which cannot always be distinguished from morbid states, are the special occasions and conduits of a stream of influx from the transcendental world into man. "Whatever its inner essence, the spiritual ecstacy in which a person is carried *out of himself* by divine action has all the outward and visible characters of the ecstacy in which he is *beside himself* through morbid action." If a naturalistic hypothesis is enough to explain the latter, why should we have recourse to a transcendental hypothesis to account for the former? Why should the latter be regarded as a lower manifestation of the *subliminal self*, and therefore considered as falling within the resources of the personal subject, while the former is supposed to be due to the entrance of higher spiritual agencies into this subconscious region?

The existence of a subliminal process, that is, of an organised system of conditions formed in and through bygone conscious experience, which, though not themselves present to consciousness, determine the onward flow of thought in every moment of its course, need not be doubted. It presupposes no other source of material for psychic evolution than earthly experience and no forms or laws of mental process other than those recognised by ordinary psychology. It does not in the least imply "a subliminal self" which exists independently of psychical phenomena and serves as the medium of communication with departed spirits. Granting that telepathy, clairvoyance, and so forth really occur, it does not follow that the mental life in each one of us can be split into two primarily distinct and discontinuous streams of personal consciousness, one mainly connected with an earthly and the other with an unearthly environment.

It is claimed that the mystical states of consciousness possess "the right to be absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come," and that as such they "break down the authority of the rationalistic consciousness" based solely upon the understanding of the senses, and show it to be only one kind of consciousness, opening out the possibility of other orders of truth. No one will deny the absolute authority over the subject of what is merely given, namely, visions, voices, entrancing feelings, and volitional attitudes. Nor need we contradict the mystic when he speaks of elation, of freedom, of illumination, of union, or of the increased moral courage and vigour resulting from the so-called higher mystical states. On their merely subjective side these experiences of the mystic are invulnerable and absolute, and as such they are not amenable to any criticism. But considered from the point of view of causal relations the matter becomes different. When the ecstatic's feelings are said to be due to God's descent into him, or to imply the existence of a world of spiritual beings, we are going beyond what is merely presented into the field of rationalistic elaboration. We are no longer in the region of the mystic consciousness, but have trespassed into the domain of rational consciousness, and therefore become amenable to its criticism. The experiences of all mystics are inevitably vitiated by their subjective character. No one can feel sure, not even the participant himself, that the transcendental or supernatural element in it is objective

reality and not subjective illusion. Nor can the mystic demand from others an absolute and unwavering faith in the intuition of ecstatic feeling. "The multiplication of witnesses, even when they agree, can add nothing whatever to the strength of the evidence so long as they all hang to the same weak link; a chain, however much lengthened by a multitude of links, is not stronger than the weakest link, and the weak or wanting link in the present case is the proof of the chain's attachment to the supernatural. If, on the one hand, the reality of the connection be in the nature of the case unprovable, as it certainly is, a great deal is done, on the other hand, in question or disproof of it, if it be shown that the extra-ordinary experience which is deemed supernatural does not really lie outside the natural laws of psychical activity, but is entirely explicable in accordance with them. In that case the assumption of supernatural intervention is entirely superfluous and gratuitous; it is the invocation of an unknown cause to make a mysterious show of doing that which is known as a cause ready at hand to do simply."[8]

In all mystic states there is a withdrawal of the individual entirely as a conscious, and, to a large extent, as an active being, from his external life of relation. His consciousness is absorbed in a purely internal strain of activity, which is comparable to nothing in ordinary experience, and is therefore not capable of being recalled to memory when he has returned to his life of relation. No wonder, then, that he regards as supernatural what appears so much outside the range of normal experience and beyond the compass of thought and speech. No wonder, too, that its rapture seems to him a fore-taste of that final beatitude which consists in the absorption of self in the Absolute. But what can be the logical issue of this? In plain language the so-called consciousness *(sakshatkara, samyag-darsana)* appertaining to the supreme goal of the mystic can be nothing else than absolute unconsciousness.

Neither in the worship of Isvara, the deified embodiment of egoism, nor in the convulsive straining after an absorption into the Absolute, nor in vain speculations of profitless subtleties about the origin of things can the means be found which will lead to enlighten-ment and perfection. Only by close and faithful converse with nature and human nature can one perceive the noble eight-fold path, the solid basis of the Blessed One's fruitful *satdharma* which leads onward to the blissful temple of *nirvana*.

A temple neither Pagod, nor Mosque, nor Church,
But loftier, simpler, always opendoored,
To every breath from heaven, where Truth and Peace
And Love and Justice dwell for ever and ever.

P. LAKSHMI NARASU.

(To be continued)

8. Maudsley's *Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings.*

THE PATH OF THE NAYAR SOCIETY TO THE "FAMILY STAGE."

IN the article on *Marumackathayam* published in the June and and the September numbers of this *Review* for 1903 I have stated that the joint-property system of the *Nayars* is but a remnant of the system of "communal property" which at a time existed in its perfect form in their society and which is usually found in every society in an early stage of social evolution. The present "joint-property" of the Nayars differs from the old "communal property" only inasmuch as it belongs to a *Tarwad* and not to a whole community. But, in the December number of this Review for 1902 I have explained the most probable manner in which each of the ancient Nayar communities was split up into a number of Tarwads governed, however, by the same rule of succession as had been till then in force. The law, now in force, which lays down that no Tarwad property shall be divided except with the common consent of all the members of the Tarwad, is by many, considered a "Judge-made law." This view may be accepted so far as it refers to the decisions that have been made since the commencement of the present mode of administering civil justice. But it cannot be granted that before the advent of the modern administrators there was free partition[1] among the Marumackathayam people of Malabar. Nor would judges have decided against free partition if this had been allowed by custom.

Conservatives among the Nayars are even now opposed to the granting of the right of free partition. They plead that, while a Tarwad property is secure in the hands of a true *Karanavan*, its portions, if separated, may be easily wasted through the reckless conduct of their independent possessors: and that, while a joint property may be sufficient for the maintenance of a number of individuals living together, its portions may be insufficient for those individuals who separate them from the control of the *Karnavan*. But the evils pointed out are more than counterbalanced by the freedom which every shareholder obtains to improve his share: and as against the reckless conduct of a shareholder we have to take into account the equally reckless conduct of quarrelsome joint owners,

1. In this article the expression "free partition" is used to denote the optional separation of a person's share from the property of his or her Tarwad.

which ultimately brings ruin upon their Tarwad property and tends to scatter it amongst fortune-seeking money-lenders. That the property of many a Nayar Tarwad has thus passed into others' hands is plain from the fact that several lands which formerly belonged to Nayars are now owned by foreigners who subsequently migrated into Malabar and are now domiciled in it. Most of the *Karanavans* of these days mind more their own private interests than the interests of the members committed to their charge; and not a few junior members of well-to-do Tarwads have to seek elsewhere the wherewithal to meet their legitimate wants.

To understand that the present rule regulating partition of Tarwad property cannot be permanently maintained under all circumstances, we must look to the history of a society during the period of its transition from the "communal" to the next higher stage—the "Family stage"—of social evolution. In this period, as stated in my article on *Marumackathayam*, "the notion of individuality" begins to assert itself first in the matter of woman or, as we may now say, "wife," and sooner or later it plays a powerful part in the destruction of 'communal' interest in property and the gradual disintegration of 'communal property' into independent pieces of 'separate' or 'private' property. Now, examining the present state of the Nayar society, we find that in it every person has a well-developed 'notion of individuality' in the matter of 'wife,' but that the old 'communal property' still exists though in the smaller sphere of a Tarwad. To the sociologist this remains a puzzle, and it has puzzled even such a great thinker as Mr. Herbert Spencer. In my article on the "Matrimonial customs of the Nayars" published in a previous number of this *Review* I have explained the most probable manner in which this incongruity has been brought about and how 'marriage' was instituted in the Nayar society. It is now very long since the Nayars ceased to practise 'communal marriage.' 'Separate marriages,' or simply marriages as we now call them, have become so common among them that they despise polyandry and discourage polygamy.. By the side of this custom the system of 'communal property' or anything resembling it cannot obtain a firm footing, and we find this truth well illustrated in the quarrels between members of the same Tarwad, which are daily on the increase in the Nayar society. Free partition of Tarwad property has become a matter of necessity as it should in a

society in which 'separate marriages' have become the rule. Partition should be viewed as the preserver of the economic conditions of such a society; and as a matter of fact, we find that no Marumackathayam Tarwad, among the Nayars, has remained undivided since its first formation. The conservatives who oppose partition fail to see that every family which they now wish to keep undivided arose from the division of an original Tarwad. They are ignorant of the inviolable laws of social evolution and blindly cling to their time-honored system of joint-property without being able to realize the slow, destructive work of the 'notion of individuality' fostered and developed by the institution of "separate," in place of "communal," marriage.

There are, again, some among the Nayars who strictly adhere to the principle that nothing should be done by way of social reform which is not proved necessary by statistical evidence. But, suppose that a pasture land to which a large flock of sheep is taken is the abode of a wolf which manages to steal into the midst of the flock and daily seizes to death as many out of the flock as fall within its grasp. If the shepherd fails to find out the real cause of the daily diminution of his flock and continues to take it to the same pasture until he is satisfied of the danger of doing it, he should be considered either ignorant of the existence of the wolf or not cognizant of the mischief it is capable of doing. Exactly similar to the position of this shepherd is that of the persons who would not shake the present joint-property system of the Nayars until they are shown a large number of cases in which the system has wrought ruin upon the community. There is the 'notion of individuality' fostered by the institution of 'separate marriages,' unfastening the tie which binds a number of individuals as joint owners of a property. This notion must, in the natural course of progress, destroy anything which is opposed to it; and it is, therefore, simply idle to wait for statistics to legislate in favour of free partition.

There are some even among the educated, who would entrust to time all the necessary reforms and allow the Nayar society to eventually abandon its pernicious customs without being helped by Government legislation. To show such people the absurdity of their position we shall consider what would happen if the society be left to itself in effecting a reform in the matter of the partition of Tarwad property. As internal quarrels in Tarwads increase, and as

men begin to support and maintain their wives and children, it will become difficult to maintain joint interest in Tarwad property, and partition will become more frequent than at present. We shall even grant that two brothers will not long remain the joint owners of a common property. But it should be remembered that a person who holds a 'separate property,' whether self-acquired or obtained by partition, is its independent master, and none can demand a share out of it so long as that person lives. Thus every woman who obtains a share of her Tarwad property becomes the 'matriarch' of a new Tarwad, the members of which cannot be separated so long as she lives. Every male member of a Tarwad may, after partition, live with his wife and children, but any unexpended portion of his share ultimately becomes the property of another 'matriarch' who may be either a female member, or the wife of a male member, of his original Tarwad. Thus, in fact, what time can do is only the creation of a large number of literally 'matriarchal families' in the Nayar society, governed again by the same rule of succession and disturbed by the same kind of discordant feelings between joint owners as exist at the present day. Nothing has the power to change the *Marumackathayam* rule of succession or to make partition free, except a legislative enactment. Time and time alone would have effected these wholesome reforms as in the cases of other societies which have progressed in the usual course of evolution, had it not been for the institution of a 'marriage' which involves no right of property between husband and wife. It is, also, rather incongruous that some among the Nayars do not like any legislative interference for a change in their rule of succession, while they are prepared to believe that their present rule was once *dictated* to their ancestors by a 'Parasurama.'

The most important reform which the Nayar society stands in need of is the freedom to separate shares from Tarwad property. This can be granted only by an Act of Government directly controverting the existing custom. A law for 'free partition' is indeed opposed to the 'rule of common consent' now enforced by custom. But the law should not be viewed as coming from an external authority: it is one which the society itself has unwittingly chalked out by recognising 'separate marriages' in place of 'communal marriage'. The law, however, may be so framed as to help the society to progress to the same stage of evolution to which every society usually passes from the 'communal stage.'

We shall first consider when a member of a Tarwad may be allowed to separate his or her share of the Tarwad property. In deciding this question we should look to the proper aim of separating a share. This aim should be not the mere independence of using or improving the share but to use it for the very purpose for which the 'notion of individuality' generally strives to shatter 'joint-property.' We have already referred to the fact that in a society this notion is first asserted in the matter of 'wife' or 'husband.' Separate property, then, is rightly used only if used for the maintenance of a 'family' consisting of its owner, the owner's partner of the opposite sex and the natural issue of their connection. No other aim should be recognised by a law intended to help the society to move along the ordinary path of civilization. The law should therefore provide that a member of a Marumakkathayam Tarwad may be allowed to separate his or her share of the Tarwad property if the separation be demanded after he or she has contracted a marriage recognised by courts of law and involving certain mutual legal obligations and rights between husband and wife.

In view of the theory that the property of a Marumakkathayam Tarwad is vested in female members, some have doubted if male members may be rightly allowed shares of the property. Although this theory is upheld by courts of law in a few cases such as that of the *Kovilakam* of the Walluvanad Raja, it appears to be founded on the descent of a Tarwad in the female line. Any family property to which succession is allowed is theoretically vested in those from or through whom the family descends, so that a Tarwad property may be reckoned as vested in female members just as the property of a *Makkathayam* family is vested in male members. It is true that the 'daughter' of a *Makkathayam* family has no claim for a share of the family property. But the case of a male member of a *Marumakkathayam* Tarwad bears no analogy to that of a 'daughter' of a *Makkathayam* family. The latter is eliminated out of the family in which she was born and becomes, after marriage, a member of the family of her husband: therefore any share which she might be allowed out of her father's family passes to an entirely different family, namely that of her husband. For this reason she is not allowed a share in her family property. The case of a male member of a *Marumakkathayam* Tarwad is different; for, the share which he may separate, if left unexpended, finally reverts to his

Tarwad and is divided amongst the other shareholders. His share is expected to remain a part of the property of the Tarwad to which he belongs and not to pass through him to a different Tarwad. It is true that he might spend the whole of his share during his life-time or give it away to his wife and children, and thus avoid its reversion to his Tarwad; but, as a member of the Tarwad he has every reason to expect a portion of the Tarwad property to be spent on his account even though he may not earn anything for the Tarwad. The custom, too, allows him a share of the property as well as full freedom to use the share as he pleases. Whatever the theory might be, a Tarwad property, in practice, is nothing more than the aggregate of the shares of all *living* members, whether male or female, which may be separated with the common consent of those members. The custom does not recognize any difference between male and female members but allows all of them equal shares at the time of partition. For these reasons any provision of law which ignores this custom and denies shares to male members on the strength of the mere theory of female proprietorship, will not only be unwarranted but also stand in the way of the progress of the society to the 'Family stage' of evolution.

Next we have to consider what ought to be the mutual rights and obligations between husband and wife in respect of the shares which they might receive from their respective Tarwads. I shall show in the article on the 'Matrimonial customs of the 'Nayars' that their marriage known as *Sambanhdan* is not the result of any process of evolution but a mere institution not violating their laws relating to rights of property. What the Nayar marriage wants is the force of uniting the pecuniary interests of husbands, wives and children, *i. e.*, of forming a "family" in which the wife and the husband are co-proprietors and children become the lawful heirs of the father and the mother. It is this force that a law should attempt to give to the Nayar marriage if it would help the Nayar society to progress to the 'family stage.' An Act entitled "The Malabar Marriage Act" has been already passed for the British districts of Malabar and South Canara, which contains two sections bearing on the subject of uniting the pecuniary interests of husband, wife, and children. These sections, however, have to be modified before they become instrumental to the springing up of "families" in the Nayar society. If these sections are amended as follow,

Sec. 23.—Where a man following the Marumakkathayam or the Aliyasantana Law of Inheritance dies intestate in respect of his self-acquired or separate property or any portion thereof, *the whole* of such property shall devolve on his widow if he leaves no children, or on his children in equal shares if he leaves no widow, or on his widow and children in equal shares if he leaves both widow and children,

Sec. 24.—Where a woman following the Marumakkathayam or the Aligasantana Law of Inheritance dies intestate in respect of her separate or self-acquired property or any portion thereof, *the whole* of such property shall devolve in equal shares upon her children, and, in the event of none of her children surviving her, *the whole* of such property shall devolve on her husband;

if, again, section 18 of the said Act be so modified as to make the husband the manager of the whole of the wife's self- acquired or separate property so long as their relation of marriage continues; if it be provided in the Marriage Act that the share which a member separates from his or her Tarwad property shall be considered his or her 'separate property' for the purposes of the Act; and if similar Marriage Acts be passed for the Native States of Cochin and Travancore,—then and then alone will the "Marriage Act" healthily combine with the "Law for Partition" to move the Nayar society towards the "family stage" of social evolution.

It may be observed here that the reforms mentioned above relating to mutual rights of property between husband and wife do not in the slightest degree contravene the existing rules of the society. For, every person following the Marumakkathayam law has full power to use his share of the Tarwad property as he pleases and to bequeath his self-acquired or separate property in favour of any person he likes. If marriage, the one which is recognised by courts of law, be viewed as having the force of a testament in respect of the self-acquired or separate property of either party, it is evident that the provisions of law mentioned in the preceding paragraph are consistent with the testamentary power which every *Marumakkathayi* now possesses.

Before concluding this article I may be permitted to express my sincere belief that the "Malabar Marriage Act," which by some has been pronounced a dead letter, will, if modified as stated above, find in the proposed "Law for Partition" a real life-restorer; that without these two laws it is not possible for the Nayar society to progress from the lower stage of evolution at which it now stands; and that the said Marriage Act or Acts will tend not only to place the Nayar society in the "family stage" but also to give men and women equal status both in family and in society—a thing not found in the Hindu societies following the *Marumakkathayam* rule of succession. Indeed, this reform will be effected only gradually and after the lapse of some time, but not immediately after the said two laws are brought into force. When that time comes, however, the Marumackathayam rule of succession will have vanished into thin air, and it will be easy to amend the Marriage Act so as to suit the Mackathayam rule of interitance which will then take the place of the present one.

K. KANNAN NAYAR.

THE LAND OF SRI SANKARACHARYA.

III.

EVIDENCE BASED ON VOCABULARY.

HAVING gathered all the evidence furnished by the pronunciation of Sanskrit words in Malayalam, I adduce the evidence based upon the existence of Vedic words employed in Malayalam in support of my theory. What is meant by Vedic words? *1st,* both Vedic and post-Vedic literature have many words and forms in common, that convey the same meaning. These words will not serve our purpose. *Secondly,* though the words are common to the two periods of literature, they have different meanings. *Thirdly,* certain words being the exclusive property of the Vedas are not found in classical Sanskrit. So the words belonging to the second and the third classes may be regarded as Vedic words and these will help us in maintaining our position.

Though Sanskrit, as stated above, has made so terrible a havoc of indigenous Malayalam words, that it has now become quite impossible to carry on a conversation even on the most ordinary concerns of life without having recourse to Sanskrit terms, the vast majority of Sanskrit vocables current in Malayalam are those that are found in modern Sanskrit as well. These words do not afford us any ground for supporting our position. They only show the social contact of the inhabitants of Kerala with a Sanskrit speaking people. But those words that are peculiar to the Vedic literature and are employed in their Vedic sense in Malayalam, as well as those that, though found common to the two periods of Sanskrit literature, have different meanings must be accepted as evidence in support of the theory that the first Aryan occupants of Kerala spoke Vedic Sanskrit.

The frequency with which certain words occur in the Vedas and in Malayalam may also go to support the above statement. The words expressing blood relationship are the earliest words of a community and may throw light on the earliest social contact of any two communities. *Ambâ* which by assimilation of *b* becomes 'amma' in Malayalam is found in the Rigveda (II. 41, 66 and X. 86, 7), and in Panini (VII. 3, 107). *Amma* is the only word used by all caste Hindus in Kerala to denote a mother. Cherumas of North Malabar and some other low castes use the word *Tâyi, Ummi*

or *Ommi*. By the assimilation of *m*, *ambâ* becomes *abbe* in Tulu as spoken by Brahmans and *appe* in Tulu as spoken by Sudras. In spite of the existence of the word *ambâ* or *amma* in other branches of the Aryan family of languages, Dr. Caldwell is not disposed to reckon it as a word of Aryan origin, but he likes it to be treated as one derived from Dravidian sources. As he has not proved that there existed any social contact between the Aryans of the times of the Rigveda and the Dravidians of Southern India, and as Oriental scholars have not succeeded in tracing Vedic words to non-Aryan sources, it is more probable that the Dravidians borrowed the word from the Aryans after their settlement in the South. In Canarese and Tamil *Tayi* is used in the sense of mother; in Malayalam *Talla* is used in the same sense, but it is not so universal as *amma*. The existence of *Tayi* and *Talla* which are admitted on all hands to be words of Dravidian origin and which are the only terms in some of the Dravidian languages points to the fact that *amma* is of foreign origin. The terms *amma*, *ammal*, *ammiyâr*, (all modifications of *Amba*) are made use of in addressing a lady of a superior caste. As Brahmans are admittedly the foremost of castes and are supposed to have introduced Sanskrit in Southern India, the word *amba* must have found its way into the vernaculars from that very early date. As we have no contemporary literature, the extact time when *Amba* was incorporated into Dravidian languages cannot be ascertained. The use of this term in addressing ladies accounts for its adoption into Dravidian languages.

In the sense of father, the word 'appa' is used in Malayalam, Tamil, Canarese, and Telugu, but appears as *amme* in Tulu. This change of *appa* (=*appe*) to *amme* must be later and must have been introduced to differentiate the two forms of *appe* (father and mother). Tulu makes use of *amme* in addressing a lady in the sense of a venerable matron. Hemachandra in his *Desî nâma mâlâ* (p. 4, Bombay Edition) gives *appa* as a *Desi* word meaning father. In his Science of Language Vol. I, p. 70., Max Muller says that *Desi* words, though remotely connected with Sanskrit, cannot be readily traced, according to the principles of Prakrit Grammar, to their origin, and that they are not necessarily of foreign origin. The want of contemporary literature prevents us from positively affirming that *appa* formed part of the vocabulary of the earliest Aryan settlers of Kerala. The absence of the term

appa in the Vedas is no argument against our theory; for the Vedic poets have not undertaken to provide us with an exhaustive vocabulary of all the terms current in their days.

The word for father more frequently used is *achchan* which also exists without the aspiration as achchan (അച്ചൻ). This may be *provisionally* traced to the form *ajjan* (അജ്ജൻ) which exists in Canarese in the sense of grandfather; since *j* and *y* are sometimes interchanged in Malayalam, *ajjan* points to an earlier *ayyan* which is simply the word Aryan, meaning venerable, respectable. The word Aryan becomes *ajjā* in Maharashtri and *ayya* in Saurashtri forms of Prakrit. It is hardly necessary to add that the form *ayyan* has been utilised to designate the Aryan settlers of the east coast. The same with the Telugu suffix garu (=avargal) gives us Ayyangaru as the designation of the Vaishnava sects among these Aryan settlers.

As Malayalam *Tadbhavas* cannot *all* be explained according to the phonetic interchanges expounded in Prakrit grammars, the word *Achchan* cannot be assumed to be derived from the Prakrit *ajja*. Hence it follows that the people of Kerala did not get the form *Achchan* from any people speaking a Prakrit language. That Malayalam is not influenced by Prakrit has been shown in my article on the History of the Malayalam Language contributed to the earlier numbers of this Review.

Corresponding to the masculine form *Achchan*, we have in Malayalam a feminine form *Achchi* which means mother. As the feminine gender of Aryan is Arya, not Aryi, the existence of the form *achchi* may invalidate the etymology of *achchan*, given above. But this objection does not affect our derivation; for the final *i*. in *achchi* is not the suffix of the feminine gender, but it stands for the final syllable *ya* of Arya. Compare *Kannya* which becomes *kanni* and *annya* which becomes *enni*.

The word *Matula*, maternal uncle, becomes *mama* in later Sanskrit and in Prakrit. The Cherumas use the term *maman* in this sense. In Tamil, Canarese, Tulu and Kodugu the same term is used. Canarese has also a variant *mava*. The other castes in Kerala use the term *ammaman* which is equal to a+m+maman, wherein the initial *a* is intensive, and *m* is an augment of a-m-mayuram—that peacock. The feminine form *mami* becomes *ammami* which passes through various transformations. *Ammami* becomes *Ammari* which is changed into *Ammayi*

The Sanskrit words *bharya* (wife) and *bhartavu* (husband), have supplanted *Kettiyaval* (bound-in-wedlock-she), and *Kanavan*. In vulgar Malayalam, *ola*, a contracted form of the demonstrative pronoun, *aval* is used in the sense of wife. The Mappillas use *Bidar*—hussy. *Kanavan* seems to be allied to the Canarese word *Ganda* which means a strong courageous man. The term Purusha, a male, is in vulgar language changed to puyyan to denote '*husband*' These terms will show what the state of Kerala was before the advent of the Aryans from the North.

Though Malayalam makes use of *Anna* (elder brother) and *Tambi* (younger brother), in poetry, it has its own term for a brother for which sahodaran-sodaran with Jyeshthan and Anujan to indicate the diffrence in seniority, is used instead. *Udappirannavan* (born of the same body) appears to be a later rendering of *sahodaran* and is invariably used by Mappillas. These as a rule eschew all Sanskrit words and have recourse to pure Malayalam words and in their absence borrow from Arabic. The modifications which the word *Jyeshtan* has undergone in the mouths of the people show that it has been current in Malabar for a long time. Jyeshthan, *yeshthan*, *Jeshtan*, *Chettan*, *Ettan* point to the successive stages of the phonetic decay of the word.

Husband's sister is called *Nattun*, evidently a corruption of the Sanskrit *Nanandri*. Cf Tamil Nattan-ar. The word nanandri. appears in Canarese under various forms—Nadani, Nadini, Naduni.

Malayalam has no term corresponding to the Sanskrit word *yâtri* (യാത്രി) and Tamil *Orpatiyar*. Namburis have had no need of the word, as only the eldest brother is permitted to marry and his wife has no sister-in-law. Among other castes brothers formerly formed alliances with women belonging to other families but could not bring home their wives. This accounts for the absence of the term.

These designations of relationship may prove that, as the relations were not fully recognised, their names were introduced into Kerala by a Sanskrit speaking people, or that the aboriginal people of Kerala by their social contact with the Aryans borrowed these terms from them in addressing them. As these terms are common to Vedic and post-Vedic Sanskrit, they do not help us in proving that the first Aryans of Kerala spoke Vedic Sanskrit. But they show that the first Aryans spoke Sanskrit though not Vedic Sanskrit.

One great feature of the social organisation of Namburis that attracts the attention of other Brahmans is the inordinate familiarity and intimacy existing between the Namburis and the Sudras of Kerala. Without the help of Sudras, Namburis cannot do anything. Namburi women are prohibited from seeing any of the male relations of their husbands or conversing with them and are therefore compelled to utilise the services of Sudra women as mediums of communicating with their male relations. So a Sudra woman is in constant attendance upon a married Namburi woman and is to serve as a guide and companion whenever she ventures out. This Sudra maidservant is called Dâsî, who is certainly not a slave. In the sense of aboriginal hostile people the word Dasih occurs in the Rigveda X. 148, 2 but I do not know whether the term Dasi in the sense of a maidservant occurs elsewhere in the Veda. In the Atharvana Veda we find an advanced state of society wherein Aryas and Sudras are beginning to be reckoned as constituting one whole people.

തയാഹം സവ്വം പശ്യാമി യശ്ച ശൂദ്ര ഉതായ്യഃ A. V. IV. 20, 4.

"With this plant I see every one who is Sudra or Arya."

തേനാഹം സവ്വം പശ്യാമ്യുത ശൂദ്ര മുതായ്യം. (A. V. IV. 20, 8.)

"With this I look on everyone Sudra and Arya alike."

From the Atharvaveda XII. 3, 13 and XII. 4, 9 it will be found that Dasis constituted a part of the ancient Aryan household exactly as they do now in the *Illams* of Namburis, for Dasis "web-handed smearing the pestle and mortar, cleansed the waters," and "threw lye on the droppings of the cow." In the Epics and Puranas, Dasis are found to form a part of the dowry of a bride and to serve queens and princesses. It is hardly necessary to refer to Vidura's mother who served Satyavati, the Queen of Santanu as a maid (Mahabharata Adiparva, ch. 106), and to the mother of Kakshivan—a Sudra maid in the service of Sudeshna (Mah. Adi. Ch. 104). In Sanskrit dramas, instead of the term Dâsî the word *cheti* is used. This *cheti* is never called *Dasi* except when an enraged *Vidushaka* may sometimes give vent to this mortification by complimenting her as the daughter of a Dâsî (Dâsîâ Dhîë, ദാസിഏ ധീഏ.) We may therefore reasonably suppose that this institution of a Sudra Dâsî in constant attendance upon a Namburi woman must probably date from Vedic times and at all events, certainly before the *Dâsî* became a *Cheti*.

The word *Sesha*—ശേഷ—which occurs in the Rig-Veda; I. 93, 4 (ബൃസയസ്യ ശേഷഃ), V. 12, 6 (നഹുഷസ്യ ശേഷഃ), VI. 27, 4 (വരിശിഖസ്യ

ശേഷഃ) VII. 4, 7 (൩ ശേഷ സൂക്തം), and which means children, offspring, progeny, is not found in this acceptation in modern Sanskrit but survives in Malayalam in the form *Seshakkaran* ശേഷക്കാരൻ, applied to a successor or posterity. But the word is usually supposed to be derived from *sesha*—remainder, to mean survivors. It is more reasonable to suppose it to be a derivative of the Vedic ശേഷ് *sesh*.

The antiquity of the word *pasu*, the only term for cow in Malayalam, may be best ascertained by the phonetic decay to which it has, during the long course of its career, been subjected. It has dwindled down to *pai*. Its plural, according to the general rules, should have been *paigal* as in the case of the words *taigal*, *kaigal* &c. But the plural form is *paikkal* which points to its original *pasukkal*.

The following three words which occur in the Atharvana Veda are used in Malayalam poetry with the same signification.

(1) Nilimpa, a god, (A. V. III. 26, 5) is not given by Amara among the synonyms of gods and is always used in the plural in Malayalam.

(2) Urunda, a goblin, (A. V. III. 6, 15) generally means round in Malayalam, but it is also applied to certain devils.

(3) Kayambu or Kyambu (A. V. XVIII, 6)—water lily—is applied in Malayalam to a kind of blue water lily; the colour of Krishna's body is said to resemble Kayambu which is the form the word has assumed in Malayalam.

In the Taittiriya Samhita (III kanda 4 Prapathaka 2 anuvaka), is found the word *kikkita* which Sayana explains as the sound produced by men to turn the attention of cows towards them, and which is produced by turning up the tip of the tongue and lifting up the head. The word has a close resemblance to the Malayalam term ഇക്കിട്ടം which meaus hiccough. As for the loss of the initial *k*, compare കിക്കിളി and ഇക്കിളി "tickling." The word *kikkita* is evidently of onomatopoetic origin and cannot be pressed much into our service.

In the Taittiriya Brahmana (III. 1, 2—5) is found the word *Srona* for *Sravana*. From the latter the Malayalam word *Onam*, the name of the lunar asterism is supposed to be derived. But when the word can be directly derived from *Srona*, it is better to adopt

this derivation than have recourse to the circuitous procedure of taking *ava* as giving rise to ô and then of eliding sr of *sravana* (=srona=ona).

A closer study of all the Vedas and Vedangas may, I hope, yield us better results than the scanty materials collected by a single individual. The field is vast and promises a good harvest, but the reapers are exceedingly few. I have not exhausted the subject but hope to add to the stock of Vedic words when favorable opportunities present themselves.

The evidence furnished by the hoary archives of the Malayalam language has been adduced to support the statement that the language spoken by the first Aryan settlers of Kerala was Vedic Sanskrit. To confirm this statement and fix the date of their settlement in Kerala I will advert to the manners, customs and institutions of the Namburis.

(1) The mode of reciting the Veda, prevalent among Namburis, is different from that of all other Brahmans, for the accents—*udatta anudatta*, and *svarita*—are not indicated by their proper intonations, but by the movements of the head. This mode of recitation in which the head moves has been condemned by the Paniniyasiksha and the Pratisakhyas. It is evident that this cannot have been the ancient mode of recitation, that the Namburis cannot be supposed to have borrowed it from other Brahmans, for no Brahmans recite the Vedas in this fashion, and that this mode must have been the outcome of the isolation of the Namburis from other Brahmans, for long periods of time. In their isolation which compelled them to give up Sanskrit and take to Malayalam they might naturally be supposed to have forgotten the natural mode of pronouncing the Vedas. I do not give credit to the theory of the conversion of fishermen to Brahmanism for the religion of the Brahman has never been a proselytising one.

(2) *Upakarma* is the solemn opening of the Vedic school term and *utsarga* its closing. Owing to the engagements of teachers as sacrificial priests during the *uttarayana*—the course of the sun towards the north—the Vedic schools had to be temporarily closed, and the study had to be discontinued. After the rains the study had to be resumed. On the ground that the *Sravana Upakarma* is an expiatory ceremony for the interruption to the study of the

Vedas which is enjoined as the duty of Brahmins, the *Grihis* (householders) among Namburis do not perform the *Upakarma*, for the *Grihis* having once completed the study are not bound to perform an expiation for the interruption. But Manu (IV. 95) and Asvalayana (III. 5, 19 *ff.*) make it binding on all *Grihasthas*. The absence of practice among Namburi *Grihasthas* shows that they departed from Northern India at a time when the *Upakarma* formed no part of a Grihastha's obligatory rites, and therefore certainly before the composition of Maun's Code and Asvalayana's Grihyasutra. Weber thinks Asvalayana to be a contemporary of Panini (Indian Literature, p. 53). Rajendra Lal Mitra assigns Asvalayana to the beginning of the fourth century B. C. (Introduction to the Aitareyu Aranyaka, p. 12). We may therefore reasonably suppose that the Aryan occupation of Kerala must have taken place at least before the fourth century B. C.

(3) Namburis have no objection to the marriage of their girls even after puberty. As only the eldest male member of a Namburi family is allowed to enter into a legal religious matrimonial alliance with a Namburi girl, and as the total number of Namburi families is fewer than the female population, it is not an unusual thing for many Namburi maids to lead a life of celibacy and die unmarried. Marriage after puberty which among other Brahmans entails loss of caste and social expulsion is defended by Namburis on the ground that the law relating to the marriage of girls is a restrictive one from which it follows that a girl is to be given away in marriage *only to a suitor*—പ്രാൎത്ഥിനെ ഏവ കന്യാ ദേയാ. But as the form of marriage obtaining among Namburis is *Brahma* (Asvalayana Grihya Sutra, I. 6, 1 *ff*) and Manu III. 27) and Yajnavatgya I. 58) in which a Brahman is *to be invited to accept* a girl, the defence that a girl is to be given away only when some one comes forward as a suitor falls to the ground. Further, every Namburi who is willing enough to dispose of his daughters of conjugal age, has, like other Brahmans, to go in search of a bridegroom and give him a rich dowry. So the cause of the late marriage is not the legal restriction.

Manu (IX. 89) would rather have a girl after attaining her maturity remain unmarried than wish her to marry an unworthy man. If she is not married within three years of her maturity, she is permitted to choose a husband herself. (Manu IX. 90—91). From this permission we may infer that Manu did not like that young ladies should remain single after a certain age and that marriage,

after maturity were not objectionable in the days of Manu. Baudhayana requires a maid of connubial age to wait for parental disposal for three years and permits her to seek a husband in the fourth year even if he is an unworthy man. Vishnu is of the same opinion. Manu further ordains that a maiden who after three years chooses of her own accord a husband is not to get any dowry or portion of paternal property from her parents or brothers, and that the husband of such a maid is not to present anything to the father-in-law.

Manu (IX. 160, 173) refers to children born out of wedlock, and to the marriages of pregnant brides. Evidently these would be possible only in a society where marriages of women took place after puberty. In X. 94, Manu says that a man of thirty-six may marry a girl of twelve and one of twenty-four a girl of eight years. The commentators Kulluka and Methatithi say that this is not intended to lay down a hard and fast rule. It is simply intended to enable a *man* to enter upon the duties of a householder.

Asvalayana does not allude to the ceremony of *Garbhadhana* though the *Parisishta* prescribes it and gives full details of its performance. He prescribes Brahmacharya for three days after the ceremony of wedding (Grihyasutra I. 8, 11). This prescription supports the view that girls were married only after puberty. In his commentary on Asvalayana's Grihyasutra (I. 7, 2) Narayana refers to the immediate consummation of marriage among the Videhas. As a precaution against the consummation before the expiry of the three days' limit prescribed, during which the bride and bridegroom are to observe the vow of Brahmacharya and to sleep on the floor, Apastamba (Grihyasutra, VIII. 9) ordains a staff to be interposed between the married couple and allows consummation on the fourth day. The commentators Sudarsanarya and Haralatta explain everything connected with the marriage of the Apastambins which conclusively proves that marriages in ancient India were celebrated after puberty. So late a writer as Narayanabhatta of Benares, in his *Prayogaratna*—the manual of all the Brahmanic rites and ceremonies—ordains three offerings of ghee (*Ajyahutis*) if the bride attains her maturity just before the hour fixed for the celebration of the wedding. It is thus clear that late marriages were in vogue in former days.

In the Rig-Veda (I. 117, 7) we find that "the Aswins gave a husband to Ghosha who had grown *old* in her father's house" and the same event is referred to in the Rig-Veda X. 39, 3. In the epics we find Devayani daughter of Sukracharya and Sakuntala daughter of Visvamitra marrying Kshatriya kings after attaining womanhood. Many more instances may be multiplied in support of the fact that there was no objection to late marriages in ancient India. From these facts we shall be justified in inferring that the custom of marriage after maturity prevailing among Namburis is a survival of the Vedic times.

(4) A peculiar characteristic of Namburis is their fashion of wearing the tuft of hair on the crown of the head (*Purvasikha*). The *Keralolpatti* says that with a view to prevent the Aryans brought from Hindustan from returning to their homes, Parasurama compelled them to have the front tuft. The second half of the *Sahyadrikanda* (ch. viii, 30 *ff*) makes Chandrangada, son of Mayuravarma of the Kadamba dynasty responsible for this innovation which he is said to have introduced among the Brahmans who had been settled in Kerala by his father and who had been brought back by himself, in order to prevent them from leaving it again. A Canarese work called *Gramapaddhati* based upon the *Sahyadrikanda* and popular traditions current in Malabar and Canara make Chandrangada responsible for this change of the tuft which is now unique among the Namburis. But the tradition owes its origin to the attempt to account for the fashion which, in consequence of the unifying tendencies of Brahmanism in other parts of India, had become obsolete and strange, and which, owing to the isolated conservatism of Namburis has remained unaltered among them. The authors of *Grihyasutras*, for instance, *Asvalayana* (I. 17, 17) and *Apastamba* (16. 6, 7) do not prescribe any particular kind of tuft but allow each person the liberty of following the practice of his family (*Kuladharma*). This permission points to the existence of diversity in the practice. Narayana, in commenting on *Asvalayana* (1, 17, 17), says that the *Kuladharma* allows either the back tuft or the front tuft. Langakshi, quoted by Aparарka in his commentary on the *Yajnavalkyasmriti*, says that the Vasishthas have the tuft on the right side of the head; the Atris and Kasyapas on both sides, the Bhrigus shave the head clean, the Angiras wear lines of hair, and others the *sikha*. This is what the descendants of the several

Rishis do at the time of tonsure (*chuda*). But owing to the desire for uniformity, the practices among the *gotras* are now reduced to one general type so as to make the Namburis appear unique and singular.

This clearly shows that different fashions prevailed in India before the time of Asvalayana and that the Brahmans of Kerala brought from Northern India the fashion now prevailing among them and certainly did not take to the front tuft at the bidding of the Kadamba prince, Chandrangada, who belonged to the fifth century A. D. When the rigid conservatism of the stiff-necked Namburis of modern days who will not allow their children even to avail themselves of western education and will not do anything to ameliorate the condition of their suffering sisters and daughters is taken into account, the absurdity of a foreign prince compelling them to adopt a unique fashion of tuft will be patent. Generally Namburis tie the tuft and allow the knot to hang to the right. In the Rig-Veda (VII. 3, 31) the Vasishthas are said to have their tuft to the right (Dakshinatas Kapardah).

To sum up, the havoc made by Sanskrit among Malayalam words, the adoption of Sanskrit words and Sanskrit proper names even by Pulayas, the present impossibility of carrying on a conversation even on ordinary matters without Sanskrit words and the large proportion of Sanskrit words, idioms, and quotations in literary Malayalam, all these point to the fact that the land was once deluged with Sanskrit people. Pulayas or Pariahs who cannot approach even the shadow of a Brahman and whose very shadow is so contaminating to the higher castes that the Pulayas cannot move about freely even on public roads in rural tracts, cannot be supposed to have had any social contact with the Brahmans. Yet their language is tinged with Sanskrit. They make use of Akkini (*Agni*) fire, *maman* for uncle, *chala* (*Sala*) for their own house, *korattu* for a Namburi, *Pennarattu* for a Nayar woman. Some of their proper names are Sanskrit, *Arannaran* (അരങ്ങാരൻ) for *Alankaran* (അലങ്കാരൻ) *kurachchi* (കുറാച്ചി-കൂരാക്ഷി), *pirkachchi* (പിക്കാച്ചി for പൃഥ്വാക്ഷി), Marattan (മറത്താൻ for മാർത്താണ്ഡൻ). The Pulaya who performs their religious ceremonies is called—Pattar=Bhattar. In naturalising Sanskrit nouns, Malayalam adopts the corresponding nominative singular form in Sanskrit. If the noun ends in a consonant in Sanskrit, Malayalam adds a short enunciative *u*, before which the

preceding consonant is doubled. The *visarga* of the nominal bases ending in vowels is dropped, *an* added to them if they end in *a* and their final vowel is shortened if it is long.

Deva ദേവ	Devan ദേവൻ	Vadhuh വധൂ	Vadhu വധു	rat രാട	rattu രാട്ടു	Jagat ജഗൽ	Jagattu ജഗത്തു

Vak വാക	Vakku വാക്കു	Kakup കകുപ്	Kakuppu കകുപ്പു	Gir ഗിർ	Giru ഗിരു

But in Canarese and Tulu, the nominative plural form of Sanskrit nominal bases ending in consonants is taken and inflected. Vidvan (വിദ്വാൻ) in Malayalam, but in Canarese it is Vidvamsaru (വിദ്വാംസരു) and in Tulu Vidvamser (വിദ്വാംസേർ). Gunavan (ഗുണവാൻ) in Malayalam, but in Canarese Gunavantanu (ഗുണവന്തനു) and in Tulu Gunavanter. (ഗുണവന്തേർ) While Canarese and Tulu borrowed these forms from Prakrits, Malayalam adopted its forms *direct* from Sanskrit.

From these facts its follows that the language of the Aryans on their arrival in Kerala was Sanskrit. The existence of Vedic pronunciation in Malayalam, the differentiation of the original a into *a*, *e*, and *o*, the presence of Vedic words with their Vedic signification, and the manners and customs peculiar to Namburis, all point to the fact that the form of the Sanskrit spoken by the first Aryan settlers of Kerala was Vedic. If the argument adduced in support of the above conclusions are found satisfactory, we have to prove that Namburis came from Northern India, to discover their original home, and lastly to trace the route taken by them in their migrations to the south.

According to the *Keralolpatti*, Parasurama after the recovery or rather the discovery of Kerala brought down Brahmans from many parts of India to occupy it but they deserted it. Then Parasurama brought from Samantapanchaka or Kurukshetra Brahmans who had originally settled in Ahichchhetra. He led them to Gokarna and to prevent them from going back to their original home in Northern India ordered them to have the front tuft—Purvasikha—He parcelled out Kerala into sixty-four villages and settled therein the Brahmans brought from Samanta-panchaka. He made the Brahmans of ten and a half villages numbering thirty-six thousand souls bear arms for the protection of the land. These warrior Brahmans were called Tangals the derivation of which is difficult to trace. These in consequence of their military life are supposed to have

forfeited some of the Brahmanic rites and are now reckoned as half Brahmans. A great many of these Tangals are found in the rural tracts of the Chirakkal Taluk of Malabar. The ancient Aryan polity, as depicted in the Rig-veda, makes no invidious distinctions between priests and soldiers. Parasurama by reason of his exterminating wars with the Kshatriyas is not held in disrespect nor are the heroes of the Mahabharata—Drona, Krepa, Asvathama—despised. Instances of Brahmans who lived the life of hunters are found in the Mahabharata. So the split between the priestly and the military Namburis must have occurred only after the complete subjugation of the land and the gradual influx of Brahmans from other parts who had grown averse to military life. The existence of the Tangals is another point in favour of the antiquity of the Namburis. It also proves that at the time of the migration of the Aryans the land was occupied by a brave and hardy race who offered them severe opposition.

Attracted by the reports of the marvellous prosperity of the new settlers, the first occupants of Kerala who were driven away by Nagas returned and were known as old Tulus, (പഴ. ളുവർ) while those who settled in the Tulu country were called Tulu Namburis—priests speaking Tulu.

The dreadful account of the slaughter of Kshatriyas by Parasurama who filled the lakes of Kurukshetra with the blood of the heroes, in consequence of which that part of Kurukshetra happened to be styled Samanta panchaka, may be read in the second chapter of the Adiparva of the Mahabharata. After the defeat and subsequent capture of Drupada by Arjuna under orders of his preceptor Drona, the Panchala kingdom was divided between Drona and Drupada. On obtaining the northern half of the Panchala kingdom as his portion, Drona fixed his capital in Ahichahhatra and resided there (Adi parva, ch. 160). The Udyoga parva (ch. 18) describes the Kaurava encampment as occupying the land of the five rivers, the country of the Kurujangalas, the forest of Rohita, Ahichchhatra, Kalakuta, and the banks of the Ganga, Varanu, Vatadhana and the Yamuna. From Drona's very frequent transactions in Hastinapura, Ahichchhetra may be supposed to be very near the Kaurava capital. So there is nothing improbable in the statement of the *Keralolpatti* that the Aryans migrated from Ahichchhetra to Samanta panchaka.

Ahichchhetra has been identified by General Cunningham with Adikot near Ramnagar in Rohilcund (Ancient Geography of India, p. 359 ff).

If Parasurama is supposed to be a real historical character, it is but natural that he should choose from Samanta panchaka, the scene of his marvellous exploits, Brahmans to occupy Kerala, inasmuch as they being fully aware of the hero's invincible valour would readily obey him and would follow him wherever he should lead them. Thus the tradition supports the theory that Namburis came from Northern India and that they were originally dwelling in the western parts of the first Aryan settlements.

That the Namburis came from the Western Provinces of Hindustan may be inferred from their institutions. There is a curious class of Kerala Brahmans in Payyannur and Kunnimangalam, two villages in the Chirakkal Taluk of Malabar, and in Trikkaripur in the Kasaragod Taluk of Canara. They are called Tirumumbus and follow the Marumakkattayam system of inheritance or inheritance through the female line. The *Keralolpatti* attributes this succession to Parasurama, who, out of great regard for his mother, pressed all the settlers in Kerala to adopt this mode of inheritance. But only the inhabitants of Payyannur village consented to adopt it. The males of this class cannot marry a Brahman girl, but are at liberty to form fugitive alliances with Sudra women whose children do not inherit their father's property and are not recognised as members of the *Mana*—the household—and being Sudras, cannot, of course, perform the *Sraddha* of their fathers. The females are to be married by Namburis, who, on entering the matrimonial alliance, cease to be treated as Namburis, are not admitted into their own community and have to end their days in their wives' houses. The children born of this union inherit the property and the males who follow all the Brahmanic rites and ceremonies perform the *Sraddha* both of their father and maternal uncles at their death. Thus among Namburis and Tirumumbus, the ancestral property, in consequence of the restrictions imposed upon them by their marriage law, becomes inalienable; brothers' children being not born of a Brahman mother have no right to it and cannot demand a division of the property. In the case of Namburis the succession runs through a *single* brother; the sons of *other brothers* are *practically* non-existent; while in the case of Tirumumbus, succession runs

through a sister or sisters; the sons of *all brothers* are *practically* nonentities. This safeguarding of family property can all be traced to one uniform mode of ancient inheritance prevalent among Namburis and Tirumumbus, and may partly account for the existing custom of the marriage of Namburi girls even after puberty.

Now, succession through the female line was the custom among Aratta Vahikas (*vide* Mahabharata, Karna parva, chapter XLV. 13). "It is for this reason, O Salya, that the sisters' sons of the Arattas, and their own sons, become their heirs." In the same *parva* the Aratta Vahikas are condemned as immoral, licentious and irreligious. The cause of this strong animosity against the people dwelling in the western provinces of Hindustan will be explained further on as due to the western people's adhering strictly to their primitive customs. We need not at all ascribe to Namburis any of the evil practices of the Arattas but from the similarity of the mode of inheritance through sisters' children, we may safely infer that the forefathers of Namburis and of Nayars who seem to have accompanied the Namburis and among whom Marumakkattayam is the rule, migrated from the Western Provinces of Hindustan where this system of inheritance was in vogue at one time. The last word of the compound Maru-makkat-tayam is the Sanskrit term *Daya* meaning inheritance. The root *day*, to divide, apportion, from which *daya* is derived is used in '*dayase*' in the Rig-Veda (II. 33, 10). It is very instructive to note that the same system of inheritance obtaining among the Dravidian people of South Canara is called by the name of Aliyasantana—the line (of descendants) from the son-in-law.

Accordingly it follows that this system of inheritance characterised the Aryan people of Kerala from their first settlement therein, and that as this system was altogether subversive of the existing state of things, it was not feasible to force it upon a community.

The *Gramapaddhati*, already referred to above, states that Parasurama made Brahmans of Dasaru, Tivaru, and Kaivartaru, all classes of fishermen, gave them the whole of Kerala and promised them aid in any emergency. Having grown suspicious of this promise these converts to Brahmanism were tempted to test the truth of Parasurama's words and were consequently cursed by him for invoking his aid when they were not in any way threatened by

danger. The result of this curse was that they lost their Brahmanhood and became degraded. Garret, in his classical Dictionary, says that Namburis were originally fishermen and were invested with Brahmanhood by Parasurama. He must have derived his information from the *Gramapadathati* or the *Sahiyadrikanda*. The facts summarised are sufficient to disprove this absurd theory of proselytism, for it has never been the process of strengthening Hinduism. Parasurama is not known to have ever been a religious reformer; nor has he been credited with any new dogma for the propagation of which he may be supposed to have founded a new sect. He was not at variance with any of the Brahmanic sages to whom he is reported to have presented the whole of the conquered territories of the Kshatriyas, and as he could not, with legal propriety, live in the land transferred to others, he was obliged, according to the Pauranic accounts, to reclaim land from the sea for his habitation. The occupation of Kerala by fishermen goes against the Pauranic hypothesis of the reclamation of Kerala from the sea, and Parasurama, who, in the estimation of Oriental and Occidental scholars, is the greatest Brahman hero set up in contrast to Kshatriyas, cannot in all human probability be supposed to make new Brahmans in a place which he intended as his own residence and which by the religious merit of the inhabiting Brahmans may be a source of spiritual gratification to his mother.

In 1089 of the Yudhishthira era, says the *Gramma Paddhati*, Mayuravarma of the Kadamba dynasty brought from Ahichchhatra on the Godavari, Brahmans to occupy Parasuramakshetra which, owing to the degradation of the Brahman converts already referred to, had become *Abrahmanya*, irreligious. The king gave eighteen villages to Haviks, thirty-two to Tuluva Brahmans and sixty-four to Kerala Brahmans. These villages respectively constituted the Haiga, Taulava, and Kerala Desa. The *Sahyadrikanda* also refers to a second redistribution of villages during the reign of Mayuravarma's son and successor Chandrangada. The high antiquity assigned to Mayuravarma, his redistribution of the West Coast from Gokarna to Cape Comorin, the site of Ahichchhatra on the Godavari are all groundless. In his report on the 'Mackenzie Collections', Dr. Wilson refers to a grant by Trinetra Kadamba, the founder of the dynasty, dated A. D. 168. Subsequent researches have proved the spuriousness of this grant (*vide* North Canara Manual, Vol. II.

p. 80). The Kadambas belong to the fifth century A. D. The Sabha parva of the Mahabharata (ch. XXXI. 69-70) refers to Jayanti and Vanavasi the capital of the Kadambas. Jayanti is supposed to have been rebuilt by Mayuravarma. Vanavasi is mentioned by Ptolemy also. But as the Mahabharata and Ptolemy do not refer to the Kadambas, the mention of Jayanti and Vanavasi is not enough to assign to the Kadambas the antiquity claimed for them by the *Grama paddhati*. Nothing is at present known of the existence of a town called Ahichchhatra situated on the Godavari.

The *Sahyadrikanda* and the *Keralolpatti* refer to Mayuravarma's introduction of Brahmans into Kerala for reviving Brahmanism, the study of the Vedas, &c. This statement does not deny the existence of Brahmans in Kerala prior to the advent of Mayuravarma. A large number of Yajurvedis of the Baudhayana school seem to have accompanied the king and modified some of the *Acharas* of the Namburis of the Asvalayana school to bring them into harmony with those of other Brahmans. For, according to Asvalayana (Grihyasutra I, 19. 9) a Brahmana Brahmachari is to wear a red coloured cloth, but the Namburi Brahmacharies, irrespective of their family, Veda, and Sutra always carry a white cloth which they may sometimes fold round the naval, but which they are not to wear round the loins. This practice is in accordance with that of the Yajurvedis of the Baudhayana school. But the existing diversities among Namburis and the followers of Baudhayana on the west coast and the Godavari are sufficient to demolish the theory that Mayuravarma broght them from the banks of the Godavari. All that we may safely affirm is that from the influx of the Baudhayanins, the *Acharas* of Namburis even| underewent some changes. The exact nature and the extent of these changes can be fully made out by those who have a very intimate connexion with the Namburis of the Asvalayana and the Baudhayana school. The Yajurvedis of the east coast of the Madras Presidency and the Tamil Brahmans of Palghaut, are mostly Yajur-vedis of the Apastamba school. I am unable to say whether there are Namburis of this school, but I am led to believe that no Namburi so far as is at present known is an Apastambin.

Having shown that the Namburis came from Northern India, probably from the Punjab and not from the east coast, I shall try to determine the route taken by them in their southward migration.

M. SESHAGIRI PRABHU.

(*To be continued*)

KUMUNAN: A PATRON OF TAMIL BARDS.

THE progress of Tamil literature in ancient times was due to the unstinted liberality of the petty princes and chiefs of Tamilakam no less than to that of the three great sovereigns of this southern peninsula. Almost every court in South India had a poet, bard, or minstrel, and the poet-laureate in each palace was a genius of no mean order. These *Samasthana Vidhwans* were prolific verse-makers, and verses flowed from their lips as from a fountain. Living on the benefactions of their patrons, they had no anxiety about their daily wants and devoted their time and energy to glorify and immortalise their munificent lords in their verses. That necessity is the mother of invention, of poetic invention too, is more or less a fallacy and perhaps contains a half-truth. Hunger drives men to pour forth a few laudatory verses in praise of some wealthy magnate or other; but they are not of the best type. Exaggeration and conceit abound in them, and what does not come from the heart has seldom the true poetic ring. "Praise undeserved is scandal in disguise;" and though the encomiastic verses tickled the vanity of the chieftains and kings and moved them to unloose their purse strings freely, yet the ancient bards were no mere sycophants. They praised the virtues of their sovereigns or cried down their vices in unflattering terms. They were their best henchmen as well as their wisest counsellors. They risked their lives for their patrons in times of war and often served as heralds to open hostilities or as ambassadors to cut the knot of disorder and confusion and bring in peace and order once again. In short, the kings and chieftains of the Tamil land needed their bards most for their recreation and their glorification, for their pleasure and their profit. Empires have risen and fallen, and the best kings as well as the worst are as dead as the dodo or moa. But virtues live for ever and shine for ever, when they find a poetic embodiment. True immortality is theirs whose benefactions to bards have blossomed forth in ever fresh verses.

Kumunan was one of those munificent patrons of Tamil bards, whose name and fame the poets have handed down to us in all their pristine glory. After the dissolution of the last *Sangam*, and the break-up of the three great sovereignties in South India, the bards found their asylum in the courts of minor princes. Naviram had its lord in Kumunan famous for his succour to the distressed. There is a Tamil saying, which places this king in point of liberality and

munificence in equal rank with Karna, the mighty giver of Mahabarata fame. His court was the home of hospitality to all those that went there in need. Poets pinched with poverty found a ready welcome in the palace of this hill-chieftain; and Perum-Thalai-Sattanar and Perumsittranar, whose birthright was their poverty, were received with open arms by this ever-generous Kumunan. What follows is the gist of the touching appeal in song made to him by the poverty-stricken Sattanar.

"My house is an ancient one, where food was prepared from time immemorial. Now in my hearth cobwebs run riot. At my door is seen at all times the wolf with its devouring paw. My hungry babe cries, sucking in vain the dry nipples of its mother. My wife, holding the hungry babe in her hands, weeps hot tears. At her sad sight, the thought of you, famous in battle, occurred to me and my feet carried me hither, in hopes to do my poverty to death. O, Kumuna, descended of a noble house renowned for its charity and hospitality, relieve me from the fangs of my devouring hunger, however adverse your circumstances be."

This leads us to the vicissitudes of Kumunan's life. "Sceptre and crown must tumble down." It is an irony of fate that the best men of great virtue suffer while scoundrels bear sway. Great monarchs turn mendicants at the magic touch of the mage of Fate. Kumunan's fair name bred jealousy in his ambitious younger brother. The latter waited for an opportunity. The king went to the forest on a hunting excursion; and his absence was availed of, and he was dispossessed of his dominion. The matter did not end there. The usurper did not think it safe to reign so long as his elder brother lived. He set a high price on his brother's head. Like the Duke Senior, in *As You Like It*, Kumunan found the sweet uses of adversity in the forest and enjoyed the forest life to his heart's content as it was away from public haunt, free from the perils of the envious court. Where Rama was, there was Ayodhia. Kumunan was every day besieged with a number of visitors, ministers and minstrels. Though the new life was 'more sweet than that of painted pomp,' yet his heart writhed every time that a needy man courted his help and he could find no means to relieve those in distress. All that he could spare was freely given away, and he had nothing to give when the famished poet begged for a boon as small as a *Kuntri berry*. The generous-hearted prince drew his sword and presented it to the supplicating bard, saying, "I have

nothing to give thee but my head. Cut it off and bear it away." The bard, startled out of his wits by the unparalleled munificence of the prince, forgot all about his own adversity in the painful thought of the king's sad plight; and cudgelled his brains to find for the king a way out of the difficulty. He took the sword presented to him, and, making his way back to the court of the usurping brother, sang as follows:

"In this fleeting earth some wish to live by fame's report, and so have striven to make their glory last; and they, who still in utmost poverty retain the will to give to those that ask, are glorious in their woe. I went to him who had lost all but deathless fame. He said: 'I have lost all my lands; and to bid thee go empty-handed would be a greater loss. Here is my sword. Take thou my head?' Thus gladly do I come from the kinsman's presence, bearing his sword which is the emblem of his love."

The usurper, who had set a high price on the head of his elder brother, admired his magnanimity and felt remorse. He hastened to his exiled brother and implored him to go back to his kingdom. The words of Prospero, *mutatis mutandis*, very aptly describe the feelings of the wronged brother.

> "Though with *your* high wrongs I am struck to the quick,
> Yet, with my nobler reason,' gainst my fury,
> Do I take part; the rarer action is
> In virtue, than in vengeance; *You* being penitent,
> The sole drift of my purpose doth extend
> Not a frown further,..........................
> Flesh and blood,
> You, brother mine, that entertain'd ambition,
> Expell'd remorse and nature;.........................
> I do forgive thee,
> Unnatural though thou art!"

The usurper was nobly forgiven, and the brother in exile was rightly restored to his kingdom. This restoration was due to the tactful intercession of the bard who had gone to him for help, and the brothers were happily reconciled, as a result of his intervention. To quote the words of Hymen,

> "Then is there mirth in heaven,
> When earthly things made even
> Atone together."

On his return to the kingdom, the ever-generous Kumunan made him no stint of his gifts whereupon the bard returned home, and, in his elation, addressed his woe-begone wife in this strain.

> "All those who loved thee,—all whom thou dost love,—
> Thy kindred all, with seemly virtues crown'd,
> All, who in times gone by thy wants relieved,—
> Call them together now; bid all the world!
> Nor counsel nor direction ask of me!
> Thus will we live, ponder no more,
> Give thou to all, my housewife dear!
> The lord of Muthiran's fruitful hill,
> Kumunan, Lord of the mighty spear,
> Hath given this wealth, which all shall share"

M. S. PURNALINGAM PILLAI.

COL. JAMES WELSH'S MALABAR REMINISCENCES.

I HAVE recently been reading the Diary of this officer of the Madras Establishment; and his impressions of, and observations on, Malabar, its people, history, customs etc., appear to me well worthy of a brief reproduction in the shape of an article in the *Malabar Quarterly Review*.

Col. Welsh's book was published in 1830. He served in all parts of India, inclusive of Malabar, from 1790 to 1829.

He was stationed at Mysore in 1812 and in April of that year there broke out a rebellion in the Wynaad headed by one Ramanampi, to quell which two forces were sent out, one from Mysore commanded by Col. Welsh assisted by a contingent from the Mysore State, and another from Cannanore, commanded by Col. Webber accompanied by Mr. Baber, the judge of Tellicherry, as a Political Officer. Ramanampi's emeute was a small affair compared to the rebellion of the Pyche Rajah which was suppressed in 1805 mainly through the exertions of Mr. Baber. I shall skip over the account of the marches and counter marches of Col. Welsh and his colleague from Bavally river to Sultan's Battery. Suffice it to say that the head of Ramanampi was brought to Mr. Baber at Manantoddy on the 1st May and the detachments engaged in scouring the jungle of the Wynaad after him retired to their respective quarters.

In the course of his narrative the author who had halted at Wallaat above the Ghauts makes mention in the passage quoted below of a sword which plays an important part in the *Utsavam* celebrated in Kottiyur in Manathana below the Ghauts at the burst of the monsoon every year.

"In a deep jungle, about two hundred yards to the northward of this house is a sacred Pagoda, the repository of a Sword, said to be two thousand years old which is annually carried in procession by a Brahmin, down the Ghaut, to a Pagoda called Tricheracoonnu Chettrum, where many thousands of pilgrims assemble to behold it. We visited the spot, and examined this ancient weapon, always exposed to the weather in an open building, in a countıy where fogs, dew, and rain, are continual. It certainly has a most antique appearance, the hilt being of brass, extremely rudely formed, and the blade a mere mishappen mass of old iron, which has been broken and rudely mended near the point; or what should be the point, for it has none at present. In such veneration is this relique held by the natives of Wynaad, that it is left in this open spot in the jungle, without guard, or any security but the superstition of the people; and they attribute such miracles to it that the ark of the Israelites was not held more holy. Its touch

is instant annihilation; and even its appearance, at certain times, is mortal. The Brahmin, who carries it down annually, must not have even seen man or woman for five days, and any unfortunate wretch who happens to come across him in his holy pilgrimage, drops down dead on the spot! Such is the tale which cunning has worked out of ignorance and superstition, and such the veneration paid by these weak wretches, to a dirty bit of old rusty iron. Not so our Sepoys; one of whom, a Rajahput, volunteered to bring the Sacred Sword out of the sanctuary, for us to look at. He did so; and, I need scarcely add, was none the worse for his temerity."

It was during this expedition that the author made the acquaintance of Mr. Baber's Sheristadar Kalpalli Karunakara Menon afterwards the Head Sheristadar of the District who was sent to to Coorg as envoy of the Government and whose imprisonment by the Rajah led to a war which ended in the annexation of that country in 1834. Of this gentleman he speaks thus:—

"One of the bravest, most intelligent, most indefatigable, most liberal, and most honorable men, I ever knew in my life, was a native of Malabar; a Naire by birth and education, but divested of all their prejudices, and retaining their high spirit only, tempered with discretion and Christian charity. Much above the middle size, he was formed for strength and activity, with a countenance bespeaking his intelligence and goodness of heart. At our first interview be appeared to me a rough manly fellow; I had then never been on the Malabar Coast, and knew nothing about its inhabitants. He was clad in the plainest garb; and, on the march, wore a brown cloth waistcoat, bottoned over his angrekah, or white jacket and had an English hunting cap on his head; carrying a single-barrelled fowling piece over his shoulder, and a sword by his side. This man no sooner opened his mouth, than his countenance displayed that candour and benevolence, which were the true inmates of his soul. I have known him intimately in all situations for years since that period, and have never had occasion to alter the opinion then formed, of my friend Canarahmenven, as he is generally called. Indeed I am proud to call such a man my friend. Fortunately he talked Hindoostani like a Moarman, as I was not conversant with Canarese or the Malabar language of the Western Coast."

In 1817 Col. Welsh paid a visit to Mr. Karunakara Menon at his house and here is his account of it.

"On the 20th of September, I left Calicut for the residence of my Wynaad friend, Kulpilly Canarahmenoen which is about 12 miles distant in a south-easterly direction and six from the sea-shore.

Canarahmenoen's house (*of which the book contains a sketch*) was near Ramnaad (*Near Ferok*).

In the middle of a most fertile and extensive valley, the estate of my friend stands conspicuous for cultivation. His house is on the western side of a long range of paddy ground, the property of his family; and two of his brothers are the principal farmers. Being nearly square, the whole compound is surrounded with

a high mud wall, covered with shrubs at the top, to protect it from the violence of the rain; having one entrance to the eastward, through a very neat upstair building, the lower part being the portico, and situated in the centre of the wall. There are also two separate houses beyond this, and various smaller buildings, surrounded by a well-stocked garden. This place of abode, in peaceable times, is common to all the Naires of rank and property in Malabar; and the saying so common in England that 'every man's house is his own castle' is completely verified here, for this and many other Naires' houses, might be defended by 20 resolute men, against thousands without guns, and even for days, against field-pieces only. On the top of this *porte cochere*, I took up my abode for 4 days; and had the pleasure of enjoying the society of a sensible and most benevolent man, with a mind far above the prejudices of his country, and gazing on the beautiful panorama, exhibited by nature from the windows. A lovely amphitheatre, embracing the whole view at once, composed of the luxriant fields already mentioned in the foreground, a succession of small woody hills in the centre, and the lofty mountains of Wynaad enveloped here and there in clouds, in the distance.

My out-of-doors amusement was equally interesting. To the right, or south of the compound, about a mile off, runs a beautiful little stream, narrow but very deep with brushwood and low jungle on both sides, full of every kind of game. A small bridge across, keeps up the communication, and here was Canarahmenoen's boat always kept, in which a man might sit all day, moved about on the surface of the rivulet, and shoot abundance, without landing. Being accustomed to exercise, I used it more as a conveyance to different parts, and enjoyed an occasional ramble up the hills at no great distance. The accompanying sketch of this canoe gives the costume of all the fishermen on the Malabar Coast.*

The rain falling in torrents all night, and for the greater part of three days, must have added 20 inches in the pheniometer, and being thus detained much beyond my intended time, proved very acceptable to my servants, who found that the kindness of our host was not confined to their master, but extended to every living creature belonging to him; since he would not allow any one of them to purchase an article of provisions while we remained under his hospitable roof. His younger brother, Ramoo Menoen, being a keen sportsman, used to accompany me in my rambles, when from an attack of Wynaud fever, every spring, he was unable to go out shooting. The weather fairing after the equinox, I took leave of Canarahmenoen and his family, and proceeded, through mud and swollen rivers, frequently swimming my horses, 17 miles to Tannore.

This is a very extensive and tolerably regular village, a short distance from the Sea, containing by the Cutwal's account, 2000 houses and a population including all ages of 12000 souls. There are three or four Mopla Mosques, some, stone tanks etc., and it bears all the marks of antiquity. There is a small canal or backwater just beyond the village, inland, and on the other side is the estate of Punnykote Keloo Menoen, a Naire and relation of Canarahmenoen's. He immediately came across the water, and invited me to put up at his house, which I did on my return, and had the pleasure to witness two games of chess played in the

* There is a sketch in the book which I am sorry cannot be reproduced here.

true Native style. The ground being smooth and checkered with chunam and the pieces cut out of the stalk of a plaintain leaf; the queen and bishop alone being differing in their moves and values from ours. The Queen or Wazeer, moving diagonally backwards and forwards, one square and taking like a pawn; and the Bishop clearing over everything within its range, but taking or checking only on the second square diagonally; so that the castle is the only piece, which can move and take, from one end of the board to the other. There is abundance of shooting ground inland; and on the backwater small boats find their way to the next stage of 15 miles to Puniany."

In August 1817, Col. Welsh again met Mr. Baber and Canarah Menoen (I adopt his spelling) at Mysore and travelled with them down to the Court at Tellicherry by way of Manantoddy and Periah Ghaut. On the way he observed the phenomenon of all the bamboos that had blossomed in the previous December perishing immediately afterwards while the seeds vegetated and sprang up in their room, forming in due time a fresh and thicker plantation. At Tellicherry he was the guest of Mr. Baber who was then a Provincial Court Judge, at his bungalow known as *Pally Coon* (Palli-Kunnu, Sacred Hill) now the coffee garbling factory of Messrs. Arbuthnot and Company of Madras.

Here is the author's account of it:—

"Here (Tellicherry) I found everything *in statu quo*. excepting Mr. Baber's residence, which was entirely new, and one of the loveliest spots in India, being erected on a small hill, five or six hundred feet above the level of the country, commanding a view, including the river and island, with both bridges, to the Periah Peak, and so diversified with hill and dale, that the eye never tired in surveying it. This hill, when I was last at Tellicherry, was as wild as the rest of the hundreds with which this coast is studded; now a comfortable residence had arisen, and two good roads, up and down, had been made with much labour, whilst a young plantation was in embryo to complete the whole. It was about a mile inland, and the sea breeze blew over the tops of myriads of cocoanut trees; which, however, obstructed the view of the shipping in the roads; the flag-staff on the citadel alone being visible in that direction, though the more distant shore, on either side, was as distinct as the interior. The climate was also delightful and I think Tellicherry one of the healthiest places in the East."

This house is considered an unlucky one, and the fact is undeniable that many merchants, mostly Europeans, who either owned it or lived in it left it bankrupt. It is to be hoped that its evil days are over and the Leviathan Firm now owning it will be able to wipe off its unlucky reputation and restore its good name of the days of Mr. Thomas Harry Baber whose name is for ever associated with the prosperity of Tellicherry. Pally Coon is now connected with the town by a fine carriage road.

During his stay at *Pally Coon* the Colonel witnessed a quaint mercantile ceremony annually celebrated by the Bombay and Cutchee Hindu merchants in which the Malayalees took no part except as spectators. Here is his account :—

"I had here for the first time, an opportunity of witnessing an annual ceremony, which always takes place, foul or fair, at the full of the moon, in August, and is intended as an opening of the Ports, from one end of this coast to the other, after being closed from the commencement of the south-west monsoon, about the 15th of May. This nominal opening is, however, confined to the Natives, for Europeans do not consider the monsoon over till October and the insurance is void from the 15th of May until the 15th of September, when all the flag-staffs, struck on the former day, are again raised. The ceremony of which I am speaking is, however, entirely a religious one, and intended to propitiate the elements; after which the natives launch fearlessly into the ocean and sometimes pay very severely for their credulity. The greater part of the trade of this coast, is carried on in pattamars, by far the fastest sailing and safest craft in the East, and so extraordinarily are they constructed, that they can sail nearer to the wind, than any ship that is built. On the 26th of August, being the full moon, and one hundred and six inches of rain having fallen this monsoon, I accompanied Mr. Baber in a gig, to the old Fort of Moilam. We set out during a fair moment early in the evening, and accompanied the procession, one of the strangest and most grotesque I ever witnessed in my life, and so crowded, that the whole road, a very wide one, for three miles, was covered. Indeed, I think an active Harlequin might have skipped on the umbrellas of this multitude, from one end to the other, without touching the ground; for every man and woman on this coast carries a *parapline*, so that from our elevated seat in the gig, it appeared as if we were moving along amongst an immense shoal of turtles, some white, some brown, some red, some green, some yellow, some blue, but all spherical. Under the Fort of Mailan, there are some large rocks jutting into the sea, which at this spot forms a miniature harbour; the water is deep, and boats were stationed about a stone's throw off, to prevent accidents. On one of these projecting eminences we took our stand and some Brahmins on another, surrounded on three sides by the principal natives of all castes. The head Brahmin then squatted down on the side towards the sea, with a dish of rice, and a whole cocoanut, gilded over, in the centre. He muttered a prayer, and having distributed the rice with his finger and thumb, to all the respectable attendants, threw the cocoanut into the sea, which was immediately followed by some hundreds from the crowd that surrounded him. A number of men and boys dashed into the water at the same time to catch the cocoanuts and a scene of amusing confusion followed, in which the exertions of the boatmen were now and then requisite, particularly when any young gentlemen got a crack on the sconce, with a cocoanut. Thus ended this extraordinary ceremony, and returning home we got wet through, as if to prove the fallacy of the sarifice to put a period to the rain; and the monsoon, this year, lasted till October, as I had reason to remember from the sequel."

The *Tenga-eru* (cocoanut-throwing) ceremony of eighty-eight years ago as herein related is enacted almost without any deviation of details, ;year by year on the beach at Tellicherry. The place of ceremony is Mailankunnu beach and the Brahmin priest mentioned as officiating is a Kutch Priest. No Malayali Brahmin takes part in it.

In the same year (1817) the Colonel made a land and backwater journey from Tellicherry to Quilon (a garrison town) and he reached Quilandy on the way on the 16th September in heavy rain. Here are his remarks:—

"The town is very large and straggling consisting of an immense mosque, several small ones, some large and handsome houses, many miserable hovels, huddled together promiscuously without taste or common sense. It is also embellished with dirty roads leading on all directions and mostly under water. When you reach the sea-side however there are some excellent buildings principal store ware-houses. The whole country I passd through these two days is rich beyond conception but the population seems by no means to bear any portion to its extent."

The last observation is evidently a shot of the Colonel at the lightness of taxation in Malabar, but I think it could not have been very light considering paddy was then rated at 40 Rs. per thousand seers and cocoanut at 10 Rs. for thousand against 70-80 Rs. and 20-30 Rs. respectively of the present time and Tippu Sultan's rate was the basis of taxation. At any rate this supposed lightness of taxation has since been rectified by the new settlement of which the final report was recently reviewed in the papers.

In due time the Colonel reached Calicut and here is his account of the town.

"This place, distant seventeen miles, once of great consequence, and famed in history from the visit of Vasco di Gama, upwards of three hundred years ago, is now no longer a capital, or even a large station. Tho town is extensive, reaching from the seashore about a mile inland, and contains many wealthy native inhabitants, with some capital houses; but it is very low, and being surrounded with cocoanut and other trees, is consequently, a very hot place. A few gentlemen of the civil service reside in garden houses inland, three of which are built on hills, and the others exposed to the same inconvenience from excessive heat, as those in the town. To give some further idea of the manner in which Europeans miscall places in the East, I must mention that the real name of this town is Koekote; and its origin is a singular mixture of two very opposite words, being no less than *koelye* or *coleye*, a fowl and *kota* or *coata* a fort, literally Cock Fort. A former sovereign of Malabar, being under great obligations to one of his Generals, gave him a small fort which he had built on the sea-shore, and fixed the boundary

or limits of his authority, by the crowing of a cock placed in the citadel. Thus, wherever the voice of chanticleer could be distinguished all round, so far, and no further was to be considered within his government. Hence arose the name; Though it is added, that this judicious Governor first established the original extent by the royal limit, and afterwards, attended by the inestimable trumpeter, gradually conquered and increased his territory into a kingdom. Be that as it may, there is now every appearance of the original fort and town having been a mile further in the sea. Temples have been seen, some years back, nearly under water; and there is at the present day, a bank that distance from the shore, covered with old burned bricks and other vestiges of buildings, some feet under water, which renders the approach of shipping from the southward, both difficult and dangerous. Above the same all is safe. Between this place and Tellicherry, I afterwards fixed my residence, having very intimate friends in both,* and boats, going backwards and forwards, take a single night only to sail and row from one to the other running along in sight of land, the whole way.

* My oldest friends at Calicut were Mr. and Mrs. Babington; but a constant and friendly intercourse with all the rest, soon gave me the privilege of increasing my list. Mr. J. Babington was Collector of sea customs; Mr. Huddlestone his assistant, Mr. James Vaughan, Collector; Mr. W. Mason, his assistant; Mr. Pearson, Zillah Judge; Mr. Hewitson, Assistant Surgeon of the Zillah; Mr. Whish, Registrar; Mr. William Fell, Conservator of Forests; and Captain Lee, whom I had known at Tutucorine, Master-attendant. One company of seapoys was generally stationed there with European officers, regularly relieved."

It is curious that many of Anglo-Indian names here mentoined are borne by officials of younger generations who have since served in Malabar and other Districts of the Presidency. We will leave the Colonel for the present at Calicut and reserve the remainder of his story for another issue of this journal.

E. K. KRISHNAN.

IS THE SELF AN ILLUSION?

OF the many able and interesting contributions of Mr. P. Lakshmi Narasu Naidu to the pages of the *Malabar Quarterly Review*, there is perhaps none which has more philosophical importance than his article on personality, which appeared in the last number of the Magazine. It is true that various views have been propounded concerning the nature and destiny of human personality. Huxley confessed[1] that he could discover no logical halting-place between the admission that the vital actions of a fungus or a foraminifer are the properties of their protoplasm and the direct result of the nature of the matter of which they are composed, and the further concession that all vital actions may, with equal propriety, be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it. He therefore held that, in the same sense and to the same extent, it must be true that the thoughts to which he was giving utterance and any other's thoughts regarding them are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena. Tyndall, again, is tempted[2] to close to some extent with Lucretius when the latter affirms that "nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself, without the meddling of the Gods!" or with Bruno when he declares that matter is not "that mere empty capacity which philosophers have pictured her, but the universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her own womb.". Tyndall, therefore, believing as he does in the continuity of nature, cannot stop abruptly where our microscopes cease to be of use. By an intellectual necessity, as he says, he crosses the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discerns in that matter which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial life. It is needless to follow these authors further. In the words of Dr. Ward[3] "the attempt—either empirically or speculatively—to outflank mind by way of matter is an absurdity on a par with getting into a basket in the hope of being able to carry onself." But notwithstanding the abundance with which the weakness of materialistic arguments of the above

1. *Lay Sermons*, p. 138.
2. *British Association Address*, p. 55.
3. 'Psychology,' Ency. Brit., New Volumes,

types and the fallacy of *hysteron proteron* running through them have been exposed by the advocates of scientific animism, one cannot help regretting that in its practical aspect the world is getting more and more materialistic. Moral responsibility and life after bodily death are no doubt intellectually assented to by many people, but often the practical side of their life would show that the most they care for or aim at is to make a noise in the world and then die.

> "To die, – to sleep; –
> To sleep! perchance to dream;—ay, there's the rub;
> For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
> When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
> Must give us pause."

Thoughts like these seldom seem to cross the minds of most men. Nay, we even meet with human beings so supremely brutalised as to assert that convenience is the object of their religion,—whose life, to all intents and purposes, consists of one perennial round of bestial experiences. Their ideal is the ideal of Aristippus—a life of pleasant and varied excitements, untroubled by any checks from morality or religion: 'Let us eat and drink and be merry to-day, for to-morrow we die.' Death, according to them, is total annihilation. Men of this type naturally look upon all dogmas of a persisting self and life beyond the grave, with the utmost horror.

Materialism, however, is not the only theory which denies the reality of a man's self. There is another which may be called phenomenalism, which, though not seeking to explain all vital phenomena in terms of matter and its properties, yet holds that the ego is neither eternal, nor immutable nor divine, but is simply a word which signifies the whole personality of a man consisting of his sensations, emotions, thoughts and purposes. Personal identity is compared by the upholders of this view to the identity of a river whose water is continually changing. Mr. Lakshmi Narasu Naidu seems to identify himself with, or at least to attempt to vindicate, this position, in his article on personality, which I propose to examine in this paper.

It is held that the animistic view is based on a wrong conception of the unity of compound things. A thing can be separated from its quality only in thought but not in reality. Heat can be separated from fire only in thought, but it cannot be separated in actuality. If the walls, roof and foundation stones of a house were removed, would there be any self or soul of the house left behind?

Just as a house is the combination of all its parts, so personality is that peculiar interaction which originates by a combination of sensory and motor organs, perceptions, emotions, ideas and volitions.

Now every one of the above analogies seems to be superficial and defective, and attributable to an inadequate conception of the nature of self-consciousness. As is well known, the strength of an argument from analogy depends upon the importance of the characteristics upon which it is based; upon whether the resemblance contains an *essential* point of identity. Is this the case in the instances given above? Let us examine. Heat can be separated from fire only in thought but not in actuality. Granted. But do we believe that there is a principle in fire which is cognisant of the fact that it is constituted by its various qualities however abstract and inseparable they may be from one another? To *us* indeed fire means all these qualities. Similarly, to *us* a house is the combination of all its parts put together in a certain established manner, but there is no awareness in the structure itself that it is so made up. Let us now advance to the question of the nature of personality, and we shall at once see that the situation is radically changed. The exponents of the doctrine under examination have defined the ego or "I" in various ways. I shall here confine myself to Mr. Lakshmi Narasu Naidu's definition, which appears to be sufficiently representative for our purpose. The self is said to be but that 'peculiar interaction which originates by a combination of sensory and motor organs, perceptions, emotions, ideas and volitions.' This definition implies first, that the self is something which *originates* by the combination of certain elements; secondly, that the elements are perceptions, emotions &c., and thirdly, that the elements, individually, do not constitute the self. The self thus is a result or sum of processes. If so, how could it know that it is itself a product and that the elements are such and such? Consciousness and self-consciousness agree in having the common element of awareness. But the latter differs from the former in this one essential characteristic, *viz.*, the power to know that the sensations, ideas, etc., which we have are *our own* and it is this power that makes personal identity possible. It is not the mere synthesising of a series of states of consciousness but the introspecting principle in man which supervenes upon those states (here comes the vital point

to be noted)—*individually and collectively*, and enables us to refer each and every one of those states to ourselves. This intrinsic peculiarity of self-consciousness is a fact which is as clear to me as daylight. It is, I say, a stubborn fact which stares us in the face and is incapable of being otherwise explained by any amount of verbal legerdemain. Nay, the advocates of the opposite view themselves unconsciously afford proof of the reality of the ego; for when they attempt to analyse their concept of the self and point out its supposed ingredients and the result of their combination, where do *they* stand? Evidently, they cannot be any one of the ingredients; nor can they be the product since the product cannot itself be aware of the fact that it is a product. Can the position that the effect is heteropathic (like the resultant heat which neither sulphuric acid nor water separately possesses) be tenable? No, since the fact of the new property knowing itself as such is even then not accounted for. However far you may carry this supposed evolving process, you will find that this mysterious self-knowing principle is left at the end as an unexplained and unanalysable residue. This principle, therefore, stands aloof. This substratum of mind was, as we all know, denied by Hume, who held that an appeal to consciousness establishes only a series of sensations floating in a void He did not perceive how it should then be impossible to account for our sense of personal identity. J. S. Mill noticed the difficulty and provided against it by saying that the series of states of consciousness, which according to him too the mind consists of, is aware of itself as a series, and thus allowed himself to slip into a twofold error.

A modern English representative of the theory I am here combating offers a subtle psychological analysis of our sense of personal identity. I shall reproduce it here though at the risk of wearying the readers by its lengthiness. He says[4] "What is required in order that the successive presentations A, B, C may all be recognised as experiences of the one soul or self *d*, is not that *d* itself shall stand in some mysterious way outside the time series, but simply that alongside of the transition A, B, C there shall remain elements in the experience of *d* which are the same at the moment when C is being experienced as when *d* was being experienced. This state of things may be expressed symbolically thus: Let *d*

4. A. E. Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*, pp. 72—73.

stand for the central unity of the psychical life of a single finite centre of consciousness; A, B, C for successive events in the way of actual sensations; *a*, *b*, *c* for the special modifications attending the experience of each successive events in virtue of the transition from the last event, whether we suppose these modifications to be memory-images, associations, or simply "psychical dispositions," etc. Also let X_1, X_2, X_3 stand for the remaining masses of sensational, ideational, and emotional elements which are present in consciousness along with A, B, C respectively. Then the successive cross sections which could be taken across the consciousness of *d* during the transition from A to C will be roughly symbolised by AX_1 ... a BX_2 ... abCX_3 ... The sufficient and necessary condition of the apprehension, explicit or implicit, by *d* of these successive states as states of the single self is that X_1, X_2, X_3 shall contain some common element of sensation, ideation, or feeling which remains unchanged while sensation A gives place to sensations B and C. If this condition be fulfilled, it is in no way necessary to *d*'s recognition of the unity of its own inner life that the element common to X_1, X_2, X_3 should persist *throughout* the whole of *d*'s experiences unchanged. What is needed for the growth of the conscious mental unity that we call conscious selfhood is not the absolute permanency of any element in mental life, but simply such relative permanency as is secured by the presence in all psychical life of a body of sensational and emotional "psychical fringes," which change at a much less rapid rate than the sensations and ideas which from time to time occupy the "centre" of consciousness."

Now is this an adequate account of our sense of personal identity? I presume not. For though Mr. Taylor grants incidentally that, as compared with the rapid succession of special sensations and of ideas and the emotions connected with them, the changes in organic sensation and its feeling-tone conditioned by the growth of the organism are brought about by imperceptible degrees, and may therefore within the limits of a single well-marked period of organic development be regarded as practically non-existent, his view logically negates personal identity and with it moral responsibility. For the term "well-marked period" is indefinite and vague, and, with the admission that the changes wrought in the self are constant though imperceptible, is even destitute of meaning. Let us hear what Dr. Bradley, who is himself no admirer of the animistic view,

has to say on this point. "Of course," says[5] he, "the self, within limits and up to a certain point is the same; and I will leave to others the attempt to fix those limits by a principle. For, in my opinion, there is none which at bottom is not arbitrary." There may be more than one "well-marked period" of organic development in a man's lifetime, and if his self in any one of them is different from his self in another, how can he hold himself responsible at any point of time in the latter period for his wrong doings in the former? Repentance or remorse becomes, on this doctrine, impossible except perhaps with reference to actions done within what is called a single "well-marked period" of organic development. We may go further and ask how a man could possibly be even alive to the fact that he had lived through a previous "well-marked period" if his self now was other than what it was before and if there was not in him a unifying principle which remains constant throughout his past, present and future. As Dr. Stout most rightly observes[6], regret or remorse is impossible on the purely perceptual plane; simply "because on the perceptual plane there is no unified system of tendencies with which the isolated impulse could collide; there is no personal Self including in one whole past, present and future experience."

The stumbling-block of the opponents of animism or noumenal idealism seems to consist in their inability or neglect to see the duality of the meaning of consciousness, a clearer statement of which I have not seen than that given by Professor Green[7]: "Our 'consciousness' may mean either of two things; either a function of the animal organism, which is being made, gradually and with interruptions, a vehicle of the eternal consciousness; or that eternal consciousness itself, as making the animal organism its vehicle and subject to certain limitations in so doing, but retaining its essential characteristic as independent of time, as the determinant of becoming, which has not and does not itself become. The consciousness which varies from moment to moment, which is in succession, and of which each successive state depends on a series of 'external and internal' events, is conscousness in the former sense. It consists

5. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 112.
6. *Manual of Psychology*, p. 267.
7. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 72–73.

in what may be properly called phenomena; in successive modifications of the animal organism, which would not, it is true, be what they are if they were not media for the realisation of an eternal consciousness, but which are not this consciousness."

Gassendi, for instance, opposed the Cartesian proof of the reality of the self, *Cogito, ergo Sum*, by the question why the argument should be based especially on thought, and why we may not say with equal right, *Ambulo, ergo Sum*. The obvious answer is that it is only as referred to consciousness that walking is an evidence of my existence. It is in fact the very independence of this universal element on the particulars that makes all our previous abstraction possible. We can separate in thought our thinking self from all that we think, but the thinking self remains and in thinking we are. Descartes therefore finds in self-consciousness a primitive unity of thought and being.

Mr. Lakshmi Narasu Naidu contends that the *I think* is merely the expression of the feeling of my existence, and I know by it only that I am, not what I am, and therefore not that I am soul itself thinking. But in the light of the foregoing remarks it is difficult to maintain this position. If the *I think* is merely the expression of the feeling of my existence, what is it that perceives and supervenes upon the fact that such is the case? Clearly *that* principle cannot be identified with the mere feeling but must stand outside of it. This argument does not necessarily involve the admission of an infinite number of distinct principles corresponding to a regressive series of *I know that I know that I know* etc. *ad infinitum* for the simple reason, already alluded to, that the self can sink within itself and is not only subject—the subject-self—but it is also the object of its own reflection—the object-self. The object-self, however, when thus made object, is at the same time identified with the subject-self, which is said to reflect. In other words, the self can make itself subject or object to itself at will, and this is a function distinct from thought as a function of the animal organism, to which latter only can the law of relativity, so much emphasised by Mr. Lakshmi Narasu Naidu, which requires the reciprocal conditioning of the ego and the not-ego, apply.

It is a stock objection to noumenal idealism, which maintains the knowability of a noumenal world, that neither the child nor the savage nor even the average man is aware of the existence of a

self-distinguishing consciousness and that the idea of the self is a late product of intellectual development. It is here taken for granted that conceptions which dawn upon consciousness late in the course of man's intellectual development are merely ideal and correspond to no objective reality. Is this assumption true? Does it correspond with our experience? Take for instance the tripartite division of the mind. Is the child or the savage or the average adult member of a civilised society able to discriminate the different functions of the mind? Again, what about the hosts of mental facts which trained reflective introspection has succeeded in revealing? As a writer[8] in *Mind* has well remarked, man can only find what he seeks; yet what he finds is already there. Countless men had seen apples fall to the ground before Newton; and yet Newton alone discovered the law of gravitation.

Another objection is that, for instance, given by Bradley,[9] *viz.*, the ego without its concrete psychical filling is a "gross fiction and mere monster, and for no purpose admissible." The reasoning here is by no means the most convincing. Observe the growth of a tree, say a banyan tree, from the time when it was a mere seedling to the time by which it has developed into a tall, majestic tree. The changes in the course of its development are gradual and imperceptible: what the botanist or any other external observer can see of the tree consists of its branches, leaves, fibre, bark, sap &c.—all being material objects open to sense perception. But can this be a reason for denying the reality of the invisible vital principle which sustains the plant throughout its growth? Never. And yet we believe that this principle cannot become perceptible except through its material manifestations: we never insist that the principle itself is a mere logical abstraction or, in the trenchant language of Bradley about the self, "a wretched fraction and poor atom, too mean to be in danger."[10]

The latter part of the quotation from Green disposes of to some extent a second point in the Buddhistic doctrine referred to by Mr. Lakshmi Narasu, *viz.*, whether or not that which knows itself as "I" is eternal. As Professor Muirhead has pointed out,[11] the eternity in this respect is to be looked for not primarily in the

8. E. G. Underhill on the "Use and abuse of final causes," *Mind*, April, 1904.
9. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 89.
10. Ibid. p. 81.
11. *Mind*, July, 1903.

absence of any traceable origin in time but in the character of human intelligence as a relating principle. When we ask the question, Is anything real? what does the question mean? It means, evidently, Is it related as it seems to be related? It is this relating principle, therefore, which renders all experience possible, and without positing which, existence itself would be devoid of meaning. While all experience is in time, that which renders experience possible cannot be in time but must stand without it. Time and space are for it and are not without it. This eternal relating principle of self-consciousness in man is the transcendental subject of thoughts, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates. It should not be confused with our phenomenal or empirical consciousness, which is a function of the animal organism. As Baldwin says,[12] the peculiar fact, that the subject that reflects is at once also its own object of reflection, is the great mystery of philosophy and the basis of systems of speculative thought. Self-consciousness is thus a divine principle in man, who is made in the image of God. No amount of the subtlest analysis, physiological or psychological or both, can ever succeed in really explaining the divine. Even the very attempt at such analysis indicates, as I have already observed, an unconscious transcendence of our individuality.

The inadequacy of all agnostic theories to explain the self in man will become further apparent by the following considerations regarding the essential difference between the nature of the organic and the inorganic world.[13]

The unities of the inorganic world are unities of aggregation in which the whole is indifferent to the parts. The parts of a stone, for instance, exist outside of each other and are held together by mechanical force. In organic structures, on the other hand, we find the idea not only of a unity of diversified parts correlated by one principle but of a unity which is due to the self-activity of that principle. What then is the difference between the constitution of an animal and a human organism? It is this: in the case of an animal organism, although we have the conception not merely of a totality of parts gathered up into the unity of a single life but also of a unity which in sensation and feeling realises, and in a sense

12. Dict. of Phil, p. 507.

13. This subject is dealt with in a most masterly manner in Principal Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, Chap. IV,

becomes aware of itself, there is nevertheless the idea of an external spatial existence, an outwardness which neither life nor feeling can dissolve. In the case of a human being, possessing a mind which feels and thinks and wills, on the other hand, we have the absolutely new and higher result of a multiplicity of differences which are wholly retracted out of a spatial outwardness. Here the faintest residuum of self-externality disappears and is dissolved into the perfect unity of self-consciousness. In self-consciousness we reach a point where the notion of force or the category of causation has lost all relevancy, for here we pass into a region where there are no longer any things divisible into parts, of objects existing outside of each other and so capable of being outwardly related as causes and effects. The indivisible unity of self-consciousness or of the self-conscious ego, transcends all differences, both external and internal. The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding parts of consciousness is, as Tyndall himself has admitted, unthinkable.

Mr. Lakshmi Narasu's contention that an eternal self or soul which remains the same without modification can have no psychological value, may be passed by unchallenged *if* we agree to regard psychology as a science which deals with conscious processes as functions of the bodily organism, *i. e.* with the concrete operation of thinking. But if we look to thought in the abstract, as the general relation between cognitive consciousness and what is cognised, we should think that the soul *has* a value. As Lotze held, psychology cannot be the foundation of metaphysics.

Space forbids me to enter just now on the interesting and important question as to whether animism has reason to feel refuted by the facts of "double" or "multiple" personality. I may, however, say that the proper answer to the question is in the negative.

C. ANTHAPPAYI.

A CHAPTER FROM AN OBSCURE AUTOBIOGRAPHY.

IT was in Chingleput then that I first saw the light in my maternal grandfather's house. My mother's grandfather was a rich influential Zemindar, the leading man in Chingleput in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. His merits and virtues were in his time sung by poets, and there are some verses extant now, which show that he must have been a person whose fame travelled even beyond the little horizon of his town, in those days when facilities for communication were very limited, and public opinion confined almost to the town, if not to a single street. One verse in particular about himself and his brother has assumed the respectability and popularity of a Tamil classic. He was moreover of a religious turn of mind. With the permission of the East India Company, the old Hindu temple in the Chingleput fort dedicated to Vishnu, which, tradition says, was built by a Hindu ruler, Timma Rajah by name, was removed and erected by him at the south-west corner of the town, and there are two inscriptions on the walls which show that this pious act was completed by him in 1813 A. D. In the front portico leading to the *sanctum sanctorum,* there is a carved pillar at the front face of which is the statue of my great grandfather chiselled out in the pillar in the attitude of respectful adoration to the presiding deity inside. The grandfather too of this gentleman was a man of some importance in his day, for it is current in the tradition of my mother's family that he was employed under the Nabob of the Carnatic in a position of some trust and responsibility, and that he was once suddenly pounced upon by the Nabob himself to render within a short time the accounts of a considerable period relating to the villages in his charge. The terror-struck servant, who knew well the nature and character of his Mussulman master, had no other alternative than to pluck a few leaves from the nearest palm tree and improvise it into an account book, and, with the blank book in his hand, to read aloud before his master the accounts, which were really given out from memory. This astounding feat astonished the villages around, and he was nicknamed on account of this incident *Verroli* (bare palm leaf) Andia Pillai, Andia Pillai being his name.

Still another circumstance connected with my mother's grandfather. He was extremely proud of his birth. It so happened that the family of Ananda Runga Pillai, Dupleix's Dewan or Dubash, at Pondicherry, whose diary the Madras Government is now publishing, wanted to take in marriage a girl from my mother's house. My great grandfather, young as he was at that time, refused to bestow the girl in marriage, because the English and the French were then at war. Ananda Runga Pillai's family in Pondicherry was subject to the French rule and the members were staunch adherents of the French. Witness what Runga Pillai says of his master Dupleix, when the English raised the siege of Pondicherry in 1748, which Malleson quotes in his life of that great pro-consul of the French—"what has become of the bravery of the English, compared with that of the imcomparable Dupleix? It has vanished like night." There is a certificate before me given by Lally to Runga Pillai, and I give below an English translation of it to show in what estimation the French held him:--

Thomas Arthur De Lally, Lieutenant General of the Armies of the King, Colonel of a regiment of Infantry, Inspector General of his armies, Grand Cross of the Order Royal and Military of Saint Louis, Commissioner of the King, and Commander-in-chief for his Majesty in India.

In consequence of the proposal, which has been made to us by Runga Pillai, chief of the Malabars, to introduce provisions into this place, and wishing to engage him in it for his particular interest, we promise him, if he introduces rice, paddy and other provisions into Pondicherry, to allow him a moiety of it, and to make him keep an account of the sulplus for the Company, which, as a reward of services he might have rendered to the Colony, will protect him in everything and everywhere. Signed, Lally.

The 3rd November, 1760.

These were stirring times in this part of Southern India and little did this favourite of Louis XV, this interesting historical figure, who, like Dupleix, came to India with grand ambitions and succeeded the year previous in capturing Madras, dream that he would lose Pondicherry a year afterwards, be captured by the English and sent to England, and finally three years later tried in his own native country, convicted and beheaded.

We find further that by the express order of king Louis XVI, under date of the 10th February 1766, Rungappa Thiruvengadam (nephew and successor of Ananda Runga Pillai) was named "Chief of the Malabars and of the Indians at Pondicherry in reward of his services rendered to France as much by him as by his ancestors"—and because during the siege of Pondicherry "he gave himself much trouble and care to procure every day coolies for the works, and has himself raised and maintained a company of *sepahis* which has done service on the bastions" &c. My mother's family, on the other hand, was loyal to the English. Happily after peace and good will were restored between these two great nations, the marriage was performed and these two families became united by ties of marriage and friendship. Such the family in which I was born.

My mother's mother was very fond of me. In fact most of my childhood I spent with her, instead of with my mother. This grandmother who died in 1893 when she was about 85 was a granddaughter of Varada Pillai, Dewan or Dubash, as men in similar positions were called in those days, of General Joseph Smith, who fought the battle of Chengamma on the 16th September 1767, which was the first great check upon the hitherto successful carrer of Hyder, and who afterwards became Commander-in-Chief. This General was a terror to the Mysorean troops, and once in 1768, when Colonel Wood was in extremities, a party of his men got by a back hill and surprised Hyder by shouting—"Smith! Smith! Hurrah! Hurrah!", and the Mysoreans, supposing the dreaded leader Smith, who was really at a different place, had appeared on the scene, dispersed. There can be no doubt that this General, whose oil painting, more than a hundred years old, is now in my possession, is a man of remarkable character, determined will and dogged stubbornness; and if the face is to be the index of a man's character, the bold lineaments show his English mastiff kind of tenacity and perseverance. It is said that all the above characteristics of the man were brought into full play at the battle of Chengamma; and it is a fortunate circumstance for England that she was able to possess Generals of the stamp of Clive, Eyre Coote and Smith at the most critical period of her connection with India.

My grandmother used to feed my ears with stories of the wars of those times and of the cruelties of Hyder and Tippu, of how the very name of Hyder was sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of the inhabitants of Madras and the neighbouring places, and how her

own grandmother when young lived many anxious days in Fort St. George with the women of other respectable families, with their faces disfigured by charcoal, for fear of Hyder taking away young women for his harem.

There is a story current of Hyder's doings in one of the villages of the south through which he passed. The inhabitants, who got scent of his passing through their village, had all their young women put in huge baskets of wicker work, such as are generally used for storing large quantities of grain and left to remain in the open. This they did in order not to excite his suspicion, and, when he passed through their village, he called out all the immates, male and female, to turn out before him; and, finding only old women there, selected the oldest of them and directed her to dance before him. This old woman of between seventy and eighty danced before Hyder to the following refrain.

> To whom else but you am I going to dance, O mighty Hyther!
> For never in my life did I feel lither.

And the inmates in the baskets were not able to repress their laughter, and a little tittering from them revealed the trick, and the story runs that Hyder forgave the villagers for their ingenuity and ordered his men not to molest the young women.

Tanjore under Maharajah Tulalji was besieged by General Joseph Smith in 1773. The siege commenced in July and the town fell on the 16th September. After its fall, it was given to be looted. General Smith's Dubash Varada Pillai, happening to enter a portion of the king's palace, came across a young woman of the royal household sitting near a millstone, with a small basket full of genuine pearls of various sizes, worth a mint of money, and breaking them. Questioned as to what her motive was, she replied; "I would rather break these with my own hands than see them with my own eyes carried off as booty by strangers." Varada Pillai, touched by this bold reply as well as this act of reckless despair, had orders issued that the lady shonld not be molested; and she in gratitude presented him with among other gifts two valuable woman's clothes, the ends of which were worked in pearls. This is a sample of my grandmother's stories.

Nor was my father's family less distinguished. The Thottakkadu family to which I belong is a respected family in Madras. In our section of the caste, there are about twenty families

amongst whom only intermarriages could take place, and there is a sort of clannish feeling prevailing amongst them, similar to what we see in Scotland. My grandfather was a District Munsiff, but his father and forefathers for many generations were the sole proprietors of the village of Thottakkadu, fourteen miles north-west of Madras, through which the East Coast Railway now passes. Two incidents connected with my family will throw some light on the status of the family. My great, great grandfather had a beautiful sister, a young girl of fifteen or sixteen summers soon to be bestowed in marriage upon a young man of our clan. Her great beauty was the talk of the surrounding villages; the neighbouring petty chief—a Poligar of a most unscrupulous nature—wanted to carry the girl away by force. Although her brother was a petty chieftain himself, he had not the strength, influence or a sufficient number of men to withstand his more powerful enemy, who had a number of villages under his control. Rather than bring life-long disgrace upon the family, he with his brothers was reluctantly forced to take away her life at her earnest entreaties. She preferred death to dishonour. Hence this Spartan contempt for life.

Whether the above is true or not, I only give it to show that there is an incident of this nature connected with my family, and that in those days the honour of women was counted of no avail, and that the Mussulman Nabobs did not care to guard zealously the welfare and the honour of their subjects, and that they were weak against their dependants, the powerful Poligars, who were dependent only in name. In consequence of this, there had been deadly enmity between my family and that of the neighbouring chieftain, which continued till the beginning of the last century, as will be seen from the following open rupture. This incident was related to me by an old farmer of our village in the early seventies, when I went over there with my father to spend a portion of my college vacation. My informant was about eighty years old; and he narrated this, assuring me he was an eye-witness in his boyhood days of the subsequent reconciliation. His posture then—an old man, bent with years—leaning on his staff, holding its one end in the grip of his two hands and resting his chin upon them—and his whole frame dilating at the end of the story when he stood erect, are indelibly fixed in my memory. I shall never forget the posture and his feelingful narration given with much naturalness. "On a

certain day" he said "in the early morning, a descendant of the scoundrel, who was the cause of the poor girl's unhappy end, went in his palanquin through our village, after having a bath in the river Courtellior yonder there, thinking that nothing would happen after his religious ablutions and thinking also that the old feeling was by now forgotten. Your great grandfather was sitting on this very pial, holding his court in the presence of a good number of farmers and servants. The knowledge that the hereditary foe of your family was in the palanquin so enraged him that he gave way to his feelings and exclaimed—"That sinner and wretch in the palanquin there has contaminated our village ground and even polluted its air, so much so that a purification ceremony is necessary." The Poligar hearing this ordered his bearers to hurry on; he went away in silence, but secretly vowing vengeance. That very day, he ordered two of his trusted ruffians to bring your great grandfather's head asking them to do the deed at deat of night. This resolve somehow reached his wife, your great grandmother, and she immediately despatched a fleet-footed servant to Veeraperumal Pillai, her husband's brother-in-law and Dubash to Sir Charles Oakley, Governor of Madras, to acquaint him of the news. At about 9 P. M. after your ancestor went to bed, assistance arrived to guard the house and he was agreeably surprised the next morning to know the whole affair, especially as his wife did not inform the husband of what she heard till next morning. The end of all this was that the Governor's Dubash came to our village the next day and brought about the friendship of the two long quarrelling families by making your ancestor and the Poligar swear on our holy book the *Ramayana*, that they should no more entertain bitter feelings against each other, but be lifelong friends." Such the incident related to me by the old man.

Supposing the dastardly resolve of the ruffian chieftain had not reached my great grandmother's ears, and supposing the hired assasins had done the deed, would Ramakrishna have written these pages for the delectation of his small circle of friends, at whose instance he is writing them? At this moment, I cannot but recall to mind, of course comparing great things to small, what had happened to an ancestor of the great Frenchman Mirabeau, one of those who brought about the French Revolution. This ancestor of Mirabeau was engaged in the battle

of Casano, and, while he was guarding a bridge, "a bullet struck him in the throat, cut asunder the tendons, the jugular veins; he sank on the bridge; the troops broke and fled. An old sargeant could only cast a camp kettle over his head and then run," while all others thought him to be dead. Upon this, Carlyle moralises in his peculiar fashion.—" How nearly at this moment, it was all over with the Mirabeaus, how but for the cast of an insignificant camp kettle, there had not only been no article *Mirabeau* in this Review (London and Westminister Review), but no French Revolution. Not only the French Revolution, but all revolutions and achievements whatsoever, the greatest and the smallest, which this world ever beheld, have not once, but often in their course of genesis depended on the veriest trifles, castings of camp kettles, turning of straws; except only that we do not *see* that course of theirs. So inscrutable is genetic history, impracticable the theory of causation, and transscends all calculus of man's devising. Thou thyself O Reader (who art an achievement of importance), over what hairsbreadth bridges of accident, through yawning perils, and the man devouring gulf of centuries, hast thou got safe hither—, from Adam all the way!"

It is in no spirit of exultant pride, pride of birth or family, that I narrate the incidents of this chapter, but simply as throwing some sidelights on the state of Hindu society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These will also explain in some measure the opening chapter of my *Padmini* and the two prophecies which I made my heroines, *Chandra* and the *Queen of Gingee*, utter before they ascended the funeral pyre, and some of my readers have said that there was more of feeling than of fact in them and that the pictures there were rather overdrawn. But a constant recollection of the painful incident with regard to one of the virgins of our family effaced from existence altogether to preserve the honour of the family will account for those pictures, which my readers, who live in an age when such things are impossible and are only considered as dreams of an unreal past, will, I hope, set down not as the products of a poet's imagination, but as those of a genuine feeling felt with regard to the sacredness of the honour of women and the life of our fellow-beings.

T. RAMAKRISHNA.

IS THERE NOT A CAUSE?

And David said, Is there not a cause? And he chose him five smooth stones.
I. Sam. 17.

IN the following pages I mean to examine a view of Personality, put forth in the last issue of this magazine, which claims to represent the Buddhist standpoint. My line of argument against this way of thinking will be threefold. I shall first show its complete disagreement with the teaching of modern Psychology as illustrated by the writings of the leading exponents of current Western thought. This for the sake of convenience I shall call the argument of Theoretical Psychology. I shall next take up another side of the subject, and show how not only Philosophy but Science as well, and the results obtained by eminent scientific men coming from the diverse fields of Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Psychology and Sociology to unite in the experimental study of the mind (for to facts and experiment the sceptic appeals and to facts and experiment he shall go) directly contradict the conclusion to which the self-styled Buddhist comes. Self-styled I say, for after the argument of Experimental Psychology, I shall show that the blind abyss into which the writer would have us gaze and which he calls his vision of Truth, is not Buddhism at all but in its frog-like conception of experience and of life and its repudiation of the characteristic tenet of the profoundest Eastern thought, spiritual continuity, is a sham Buddhism manufactured from materials imported from Fetter Lane, E. C., and no more resembles the soaring flight of Buddha's teaching than the shoddy of Manchester and cheap Brummagem gods of brass are the delicate tissue and cunning workmanship that once were India's pride.

After asserting, much as the ostrich asserted the non-existence of the simoom, that Christianity is to be reckoned amongst the other dying faiths of mankind, as all equally vitiated by their fundamental 'animism,' a term which, after the fashion of some ethnologists, is used in a contemptuous sense, the writer proceeds to expose what he considers to be the root fallacy of the animistic, as opposed to his own, which is, of course, the true view. This latter we may call Associationism for William James seems to be right when in his prose elegy on the death of Myers (Proc. S. P. R. Part XLII) he divides the psychological world of today into these two opposing camps,

though it is not under the banner of Associationism, as the writer appears to believe, that the greatest living psychologist is himself enlisted. Along with the veteran biologist, Russel Wallace, we may all say, (James, Myers, Hodgson, Hyslop, Schiller, Ward included) 'I am an Animist, and I am not in the least frightened or ashamed of the name.'

The fallacy, then, that those who believe in personality are guilty of, is this: they have a wrong conception of the unity of compound things. The position here taken up is clear. It is asserted by the writer, first, that the person is a *thing*, and secondly, a *compound thing*. As regards the first point, is it meant that the mind is a material 'thing,' a thing in space, an object in the ordinary sense? If so, one would like to know what is space, and what meaning it has without some unifying principle or mind. Space is a relation, and without some relating activity to constitute points and distances, the spatial parts and wholes, is inconceivable. As Bosanquet says, the popular confusion is between bodies external to one another or to an organism, and so outside each other, and the externality and outsideness of body to the mind, to which the category 'outsideness' does not itself apply, all bodies equally being in and for the mind. Or as even Huxley in a moment of insight puts it, though it of course flatly contradicts other dogmatic passages in his writings, 'what matter is without a mind in which to picture it, I have never been able to understand.' It is certain that the problem of space has never troubled our 'Buddhist' writer, and he is content to assume that it is some kind of 'sensation' or a collection of such. The fact is he uses the term 'thing', in the passage referred, to without any particular meaning. The Logic of connotation and definition, he has told us elsewhere, is a worthless study, and he has never studied it nor needs to, the 'lucubrations' of those writers who have made themselves acquainted with that science being 'both profuse and diffuse.' Loose expressions are of course permissible enough when there is no need to be precise. But in philosophy and exact thinking, for which the writer expresses such contempt, it is necessary to use words exactly, or with his hasty 'propensity' to expose the fallacies of others, a man will, like our Buddhist author, fall into the pit himself. In English and the other Teutonic languages, a 'thing' literally means 'a think,' or object thought. Men and things, we say. That is, persons or minds and

their experiences or objects; what exists for itself, and what exists for other. These two categories are all-exhaustive. A man is not a thing, nor a thing a man. A thing is a relative term, and depends upon an analysing activity presupposed, a mind, a man, a person who distinguishes and selects out of his world-background or experience *continuum* some aspect or feature which is specially interesting to himself. A thing is a mind-constituted, mind-dependent, unity of reference. A thing is always a thing for a practical purpose, an object of conation. It is a focus, or centre on which a person's activities are concentrated, an end into which he gathers up all his purpose, knowledge, and feeling, in which his activity finds some relative satisfaction and relatively terminates, but out of which must necessarily develope new ends, so that it is a mere stage or phase or means of activity and never an activity or end in itself.

A thing is never a person. The writer is of course confusing physical things and problems in a laboratory with problems of metaphysics and philosophy for which he has repeatedly expressed such contempt. Throughout the argument which he employs runs the fundamental assumption that one can handle personality by mechanical categories, and reduce mind and metaphysics to purely physical terms. Not even biological science is taken account of, for he tells us elsewhere that 'life is only a name for a number of complicated physical and chemical processes,' a statement entirely repudiated today by the leaders of biological science in the West, who have outgrown the crude 'materialistic-monism' that was current half a century ago. The true nature and meaning of the biological problem I shall refer to further on, when I discuss Spencer's amusing 'bridging' of the chemico-biological chasm by what he calls a purely 'deductive' process. Here I am only concerned with the absurd statement that 'for modern psychology the mind is only a general name for *the sum* of all mental processes,' and its refutation by the two representative schools of current psychology the one championed by James and Schiller and a body of workers in England and America, the other by Dr. Stout, who edits the leading philosophical periodical, as well as by James Ward, the founder of the *British Psychological Review*. Consistently of course, if biological facts can be reduced to terms of Chemistry and Physics, 'Buddhism' *ought* to teach that 'mind is only a general name for a *sum* of complicated nervous and *biological* processes,' and to speak candidly like Spencer, of Psychology as Aesthetic Physiology and no more. But even the

writer's 'Buddhism' cannot stomach *that*, or shut his eyes to this yawning and, (for one who repudiates spirit and designing mind, a controlling end or purpose, as the CAUSE that moves creation,) impassable abyss, however much his 'sturdy-mind wedded to hard fact' chooses to ignore, and not to face, the 'hard facts' that *qualitative* differences cannot be explained away in terms of quantity, that the higher and later stages of the evolution process are not the earlier and lower phases repeated once again, that the element of progress, advance, *novelty* has to be accounted for, that the new condition is indeed really *new* and not merely the old state of affairs in disguise, and that *calling* life 'complicated matter in motion,' does not really *make* it so, (unless he can show us *how*) any more than by calling a horse's tail a leg, he ceases to be a member of the quadruped class.

But returning to the argument that personality and thinghood are identical, perhaps it may be said that we have been doing the writer an injustice and that he does not mean a physical and material *thing* in the ordinary sense of the word. But if this is so, then the writer contradicts himself and is himself responsible for the confusion, for a little further on he tells us (p. 66) that personality is partly in space after all, 'in his complete *nature*, *man* is a compound, body and *mind*.' And personality or mind is itself a compound. But man and his personality is in his complete nature or personality, a compound of personality and body which is in space.' The 'thing' then is a physical thing in some way. The fact is the sentence quoted is neither English nor sense. and is a mere juggling with words to which the writer attaches no definite meaning. Why should he? Meaning and mind and purpose are for him, as I shall show presently, nonentities, inasmuch as they can either be reduced to meaningless mechanical movements or are 'dreams,' 'illusions,' and 'propensities' which 'sturdy minds wedded to hard facts' can ignore. 'In his complete personality, personality is a compound of body in space and personality.' Why should the writer assign any definite connotation to the term 'nature'? Or again to the term 'mind'? He has told us that he has the greatest contempt for Logic, and he has clearly shown that contempt in the above sentence. Yet perhaps Jevons is right after all. No man can with impunity neglect the study of Logic as a necessary discipline for clear thinking and a training for

the mind. "As well might a man claim to be immortal in his body as infallible in his mind." But passing over the obvious confusion in the use of the expression 'personality,' let us look a little deeper. Let us suppose now that by the word 'thing' is meant not a material or physical thing, but an object of thought, an abstract idea, without any particular reference to space at all. Nevertheless, the argument still holds that even such 'things' are centres of interest, their meaning and unity is dependent on purpose, they are determined by other, their use and function is outside themselves, and is relative to an analysing and distinguishing activity which constitutes them and makes them ends for itself, but never ends in themselves. Leaving out of consideration for a moment how personality is a 'compound' of body in space and mind which is not in space, and in what sense 'composition' can be predicated, and whether it is composition in space or not in space, physical and spatial compounding that is meant, or some other, or both, let us turn to this point of possible interpretation that the 'thing' which personality is, is a mental thing, constituted of elements or units which are not in space, as indeed Associationism supposes. Such a 'thing' presupposes mental activity and interest and practical distinction made for a purpose. Things do not lie about loose and ready made waiting to be found or picked up. Mind makes things. Persons make things. And a thing is never a person.

But, secondly, it is a *compound thing*, not in the sense of being both body in space and mind (or personality in another sense) which is not in space, though of course it is a compound in that second sense as well, and the first confusion is still worse confounded; but in the sense of being primarily a 'combination of perceptions, ideas, and volitions' (*sic*) which are not in space at all. Even in so far as it is not physical, it is a collection of mental elements of a kind. It is true that the writer cuts the ground away from under his own feet in the very next sentence which reads, 'a thing can be separated from its quality only in thought but never in reality.' But this he does not of course understand, for he thinks he is arguing that the unity of the self cannot be separated from its quality of being a compound, and that therefore personality is not really a unity at all but a compound of items which he enumerates, for he goes on to say that we find an analogy in the case of a house; and asks 'if the walls, and roof, etc., were removed, would there be

a soul of the house left behind?' I said, the writer cuts the ground away from under his own feet. Let us see how. 'A thing can be separated from its quality only in thought.' Precisely. But what do these words really mean, and what is the logical conclusion we must come to, if the statement is, as I firmly believe, really true? It means that *Distinction* is not the same as *Separation*. To separate in thought is to distinguish. And when do we distinguish, and why? Only when we *want* to, and to avoid confusion, when we wish to study some particular aspect or problem in experience, and to rule out interfering conditions. Here there is selective attention, a distinguishing activity at work; the mind freely choosing this or that point of interest with which for the time being it is specially concerned. And why? Because *there is a mind to*, as we say, because there is a *purpose*. There is no distinguishing except for some purpose. The *cause* of the distinction or separation in thought, is the mind's purpose, because it ministers to some *end* which to the mind or person making the distinction appears as a good. Distinction or separation in thought as the writer calls it, is always relative to some purpose or end. So far then from the writer proving that the *self* or personality is a compound, his words really carry with them the necessary inference that personality is a *unity*, because all distinction is made for some end and purpose, and it is in this reference to an end and purpose that the unity of self and personality consists. Personality implies *activity* directed to some end. This practical side, this element of purpose, this factor of *conation*, as it is called, is present throughout all experience and life, and without it no distinctions could be made, and there would be no use or need of 'things.' Things, whether simple or compound, (I shall show presently that throughout Science, whether in Physics or Psychology, the distinction of simple or compound is not *ultimate* but purely relative to some end or purpose) are ends for persons, ends for other, and their unity is external to themselves. They are means only and never ends in themselves, that is to say, persons. They depend upon an activity working for an end, design, and purpose. And it is this activity which is an end in itself or person. If this is not yet clear, I will make it clearer. Take the writer's illustration of the house. Personality partly in space, and partly not in space, (and it is with that aspect which is not spatial that we are here dealing), is likened to a material object, a house in

space. 'Take away the walls, roof, etc., would the personality of the house remain behind?' The insinuation is, take away the sensational, and emotional elements or units (for the writer cannot consistently include *conative elements* or purpose) that go to make up the *sum* called 'personality,' and personality disappears. Now I ask: Who takes the roof away? Does the house take itself away? Do the stones singly or in company take themselves off? No. We are asked to do this for them. And why? Because they are not persons but only things. But again, did the house build itself? Did the several stones come together by chance from the four corners of the earth or heavens, or did some ineluctable fate compel? I have heard of stones dropping through roofs and windows with no outward and visible sign of a personal presence. But when a house is built in this extraordinary way, let the writer come and tell me that I may see it. A little point has been overlooked, insignificant enough, perhaps, to the writer's 'sturdy mind wedded to hard facts,' but of great importance to my argument and to me. And this is the presence of design and a designer. A *cause*, the free choice or *conation* of some architect or builder, *activity* in the shape of mental and physical labour, the *unity* of plan with various parts and subdivisions, the *self* or personality of the designer, his *end* or purpose, must all alike be presupposed, or our house is non-existent.

The writer's illustration then is most unfortunate, for it supports my argument while it undermines his 'house' which is his own. In the same way it is not true that a combination or sum of the mental items enumerated, perceptions, emotions, ideas, etc., constitutes personality. Just as without the activity of some architect or builder, working for some useful end or purpose, the house as a house would never have come into existence, but the bricks and stones would have remained mere possibilities in a field or quarry, with no one to shape them and fit them together into the unity of a thing; so without the analysing activity of the mind working for an end, the so-called mental elements have no meaning or even existence, but as the 'Buddhist' himself is forced to admit in the passage previously referred to, these *distinctions arise within consciousness* for a special reason or *cause*. Just as the walls and roof removed apart would not be the walls of *that house*, would not indeed be those identical walls at all, but an isolated meaningless mass of bricks, etc., (though the writer appears

to think that they are still the same); so the sensational, feeling, and cognitive elements in experience divorced from the purpose and end which gathers them up into unity and assigns them function and value, have no meaning or even existence at all. These elements are mere abstractions made by the mind's own distinguishing activity which again implies an end. For psychological purposes they may have their use, as molecules, atoms, subatoms, etc., are methodological vehicles or symbols *invented* by and for the physicist or chemist and good enough and valuable when kept in their proper place. Our 'sturdy minded' Buddhist tells us, 'he who thinks there are *real atoms* knows precious little of science.' Why then should such 'a sturdy mind' contradict himself when he declares mind to be a 'combination' of *real* psychological atoms? It is clear he has never reflected on the source and origin of atoms, physical or psychological. Here I would call his attention to some profound remarks in a lecture on Radium by an eminent western physicist who repudiates *in toto* the views of Personality, and Godhead which characterise the self-styled 'sturdy' but in reality superficial 'thinking' of the so-called 'Buddhist' physicist of Madras. Outside the field of psychology, and apart from the end which the distinction there serves, 'sensations' and the other items enumerated, have no existence or meaning, for they are useless to the ordinary man who is not concerned with the analysis of mind. In experience we never find them loose and ready-made. We make them for our own purposes. All students of psychology are aware of this; but our pseudo-Buddhist does not seem to have read any good elementary manual on the subject, and consequently speaks of what are really mere abstractions as if they were statical and complete *things-in-themselves*. If he had not been in such haste to reduce Biology to Physics, the concept of evolution and development might have led him to suspect that these entities have only been *grown* by us after all and that the mind is indeed at least a living organism whatever else and more may be implied by design and purpose, and is not what he calls 'hard and sturdy' which is really a dead, inert, and meaningless machine. It is true that the continuity of spirit and an endless evolution is the heart and soul of Buddhism. But this 'Buddhist' thinks by means of pre-Darwinian terminology, and has not yet outgrown the Noah's ark or compartmental view of mind.

But if the elements or units of which Personality is the 'combination' are not really things-in-themselves, nor ends, nor beginnings either, (Personality itself is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end), if they are distinctions which the mind draws and emphasises for its own satisfaction, aspects or elements of experience which it constructs and dwells upon and finds of interest, so that as ends or centres of interest they are given a relative unity of being of their own, this unity is mind-dependent and is due to their being dragged as it were into the foreground or field of attention to undergo a fuller scrutiny, attention or reconstruction in consequence of their interesting nature and for some special purpose, and they can never be cut absolutely loose, still less do we *find* them so, from the rest of the experience continuum, the field, the whole, the unity of mind, out of which they are made to stand in relief and into which again when curiosity is satisfied, they ultimately return and sink. The real meaning of attention, which is simply conation reduced to its lowest terms, where the element of activity is at a minimum though of course such an element can never *wholly cease* to be, attention, or active tension, or the stretching of the mental muscles, like the bending of a bow, may be illustrated by the movements made with the microscope in adjusting the instrument now to this, now to that portion of the field of vision and bringing point after point distinctly into focus, one dropping out of view as another rises into prominence until the end desired is at last attained. To say that personality is a compound thing, a combination of perceptions, emotions, etc., is like saying that under the microscope the different features from time to time distinguished, now large, now small, are all loose and disconnected pieces, so many different and separate pictures joined together mechanically by some agency or cause outside. But of course to the 'Buddhist' these pictures are *themselves* the microscope, themselves the movements of it, themselves the inquiring person looking at them, themselves the cause of the movements and the reason why he looks. It is hardly necessary to say that so absurd an 'explanation' of personality has been long obsolete amongst Western thinkers whatever acceptance it may still find amongst 'Buddhists' or 'sturdy physicists' in Madras.

As it is my experience that there is the greatest difficulty in getting 'sturdy minds wedded to hard fact' of the type under examination,

to read any capable modern writer on psychology, and much more to get them to understand what they read, when it does not satisfy their propensities 'to think along the lines of least resistance,' in other words not to think at all; I shall here illustrate my arguments by a passage, reviewing the fallacy I have referred to, which occurs in an article from the pen of Professor Sorley of Cambridge University. 'We have no experience of the mere sensation. For the subject which experiences it, it is merely an element in a complex and ever-changing whole. This is a point which has been commonly overlooked by the Associationist psychologists. They started with a succession of disconnected mental molecules, called sensations, and attempted to trace the growth of mental life from their *combination*. But this is to begin with an abstraction. The growth of knowledge consists not only in the addition of new elements, but in drawing new lines of distinction and forming new groupings of elements, and these distinctions and groupings may be said to be determined by the varying intensities of different elements in the changing mental content, or by the continuous redistribution of attention.' Again, 'If the ultimate datum of consciousness is not separate atoms of presentation, but what Dr. Ward calls a presentation—*continuum*, and if the growth of mind consists not merely in additions to that continuum, but in drawing new lines of *distinction* and connection *within* it, we may see how neither the so-called 'feeling,' nor the so-called 'relation between feelings' is independent and conceivable by itself, and how both are simply abstractions from the state of mind which, even at its simplest, is concrete.' Some time ago when reviewing the state of the psychological world after Spencer's death, I wrote as follows, though I am aware that a 'Buddhist,' who speaks of all Logic as 'mystification,' who ridicules the eminent Physicist Lodge as an 'over-imaginative mind,' who divides the great Psychologist James into two contradictory halves, one 'materialistic-monist,' the other 'metaphysical' and with such 'a bump of credulity that he believes anything he will', and moreover stands guilty of employing 'subterfuges' when exposing the prejudice that 'consciousness is *produced* by the brain; will never condescend to read, much less to *answer*, the argument there employed.

Experience does not as the Associationist supposes consist of the arbitrary and mechanical union in piecemeal fashion of ultimate and discrete elementary experiences, but all experience is one. We start with a continuum, the simple child-world, or child-experience, which, if we like, to distinguish from more

developed consciousness we may describe as 'sensation,' and the mental life consists in an increasing organic differentiation and integration of that elementary whole. But the particular and definite states of Bain and even, after all, of Spencer are the result, and not the presupposition, of the distinguishing activity of the mind analysing for some definite end. This practical side, this element of purpose. this conative aspect of experience is alway present. It is this teleological factor, the very mark of spirit or personality, which Spencer ignores.

All spiritual life implies activity for some freely adopted end or reason which is at once the final, efficient and formal cause and explanation of the process in all its varied stages of development, and which gives unity to the whole act, and without which any and every phase would become unmeaning, and the whole experience disintegrate and drop to pieces, but in the light of which each part is seen to carry the others with it by inward implication (not by external suggestion) and to fall into its proper place as a means of the final fulfilment.

The whole Universe may be symbolised by an immense cone the converging lines from the base of which meet at infinity, or by that City of God which intellect, in Tennyson's words,

> "Knowing all arts had touched and everywhere,
> At Arthur's ordinance, tipt with lessening peak
> And pinnacle, and had made it spire to heaven."

'All things are to be made according to the pattern of St. Michael's Mount.' And what is true of the whole universe is true of the simplest act of mind. Returning to our orange, and some curious child attracted by the look of a bright and strange and interesting object, let us suppose that it goes through all the experiences of seeing, feeling, handling. smelling, tasting and finally eating. Now all these are not disconnected experiences without organic relation to one another so that on a subsequent occasion the yellowness in itself is the same naked yellowness, only externally clothed upon with meaning by the 'nascence' or rising up in the child mind of more or less explicitly revived experiences of pressure, taste, and the like, but from the very first the visual sensation has acquired a *growth of meaning*, is radically and organically modified, and in its primitive state can never be again recovered, the severest effort of psychological abstraction artificially made only giving us an approximation. The act was one continuous process of experience, the several parts, not really detached, being relative to the one end, the satisfaction of the child's curiosity, as only stages of, or means towards, its final realisation. It is this unity of interest, this practical end, which exercises an organising and modifying influence upon the various 'elements' or stages of the process, so that when they occur again, they occur with a new meaning compared with that which they originally possessed. The original process, with its thread of continuity, in the form of a shaping and organising activity working for an end, running through the whole, leaves behind as a result a cumulative disposition, so that there is a re-excitement of the whole on the re-occurrence of any of the original aspects, a re-excitement not necessarily explicit unless circumstances require, but implicit to the extent that the whole is contained in and colours the part with its own peculiar meaning. The part or vehicle explicitly present is a true part, and means the whole which is implicitly seen therein.

It is true that in the next sentence, after making merry, unfortunately for himself, with 'the soul of a house,' our pseudo-Buddhist uses the term *part* himself, and says that the house is the combination of all its *parts*, and a little later quotes some Buddhistic text about a chariot and its various *parts*. But here again I must complain of the writer's contempt for Logic and his improper use of words. He either uses the term 'part' in a purely 'Buddhist' sense, or without any clear realisation of its meaning. If the house is really a unity, a whole, and we can rightly speak of its *parts* at all, it is difficult to see what purpose is served by comparing it to Personality which is *not* a whole, but a 'sum' or combination.' But how is the house a whole and why? Whence is its unity derived? Did the bricks conspire together to leave their single blessedness and throw in their lot with one another? Can the stones, unhewn, unshapen, properly be described as parts? No! Their unity is not their own, but of another's making, and drawn from that source of unity throughout experience, whether the unity of dust-speck, or of nation, or of starry system, or of world-thought of profoundest thinker, or the unity of all creation as in the design of the Great Architect of the Universe, a unity of active purpose and of end.

Some are by nature unity; some achieve unity; and some have unity thrust upon them. God alone is unity realised and complete. We men are working out our true unity, true Personality and selfhood according as we gather up our lower and random impulses into some organised system and plan of life, some over-ruling end or master-purpose, to which all other ends are only means and relative, and which makes the man the man he is.

And so of nations, a real unity may be achieved when the individual citizens or persons agree to sink their lesser differences, and are inspired by a common purpose, to be realised not from outside, mechanically, by the compulsion of the Almighty or a Benevolent Government, or the natural stress of circumstance moving 'along the lines of least resistance,' which renders all real reform impossible; but never at all if not through the active strenuous efforts of the persons themselves, whose conscience, God's vice-regent, tells them, if they will but listen to it, of their own real responsibility and freedom, and of an ideal of what *ought* to be, but which not even God can bring about without their free accord and willing co-operation; a free people and not a race of slaves or underlings serving

Him and each other and the noblest interests of their country, because they are of one heart and purpose, and like the children of Israel have passed out of the bondage of Law and compulsion and efficient causes, into the new dispensation of grace and freely chosen ends, from the tyranny of a dead impersonal abstraction, 'not this, not that,' nor any thing at all in particular, to the recognition that God is Love.

> Think, Abib! Dost thou think?
> So, the All-Great, were the All-Loving too.
> So, through the thunder comes a human voice
> Saying, "O heart I made, a heart beats here!
> Face, My hands, fashioned, see it in Myself!
> Thou hast no power nor mayst conceive of Mine,
> But love I gave thee, with Myself to love
> And thou must love Me who have died for thee!

But things have no unity of their own. Their meaning, end, and function lies outside themselves, arbitrarily determined and by another, by a person, for personality is the beginning and the end. Things have no life and purpose of their own like persons. They are always means. And means to what? To persons who are ends in themselves. Personality is itself unity, and the source of any dependent unity that things may possess. The world is a unity because it is the partial expression of God's plan and purpose, not a purpose yet fully realised and achieved but an ideal in no ways conceivable as a dead, and impersonal unity of which men are so many transient sparks, or phases, but as a *living unity* of heart and purpose, a society of perfect *unanimity*, where God is a Father, whose friendship needs must involve the independence of the persons to receive and return His love which far from discouraging the belief in freedom and individual effort, is ever inspiring it and raising it to a higher power.

And things are unities in the sense that they are ends in which a purposeful activity finds a relative satisfaction or termination, explicit means through which alone an implicit purpose becomes realised and into which at least momentarily all activity is gathered up and concentrated, and ends and means are one.

A thing is a unity only in so far as it is a part or stage or aspect of the experience process, the whole meaning of which is found in some reasonable end, which is both final and efficient *cause*. Apart from reference to this end, in which the whole activity terminates, and which is progressively being achieved through every stage of the

experience-process, there is no real unity. This end gives unity to the whole act, and every part or stage, or aspect, or thing, or means whatever, derives what unity it has therefrom.

A house, then, is a unity because it carries a reference to some consistent plan and design which represents the activity of a personality or author, is in a word the expression of his end. Granting this element of purpose in the mind of the architect or builder, the formless materials assume shape and meaning and are seen in their true setting as parts or aspects of the whole. But I contend that ignoring this conception of active purpose, the 'Buddhist' has no right to speak of *parts* at all, for there is no whole or unity to which they carry reference, no consistent purpose or design. A 'thinker' who reduces life and consciousness to mere mechanical movements cannot predicate unity of his house. Like his own idea of personality the materials are a mere collection, a combination effected by some agency unknown which arbitrarily determines their arrangement; but that this agency is intelligent and designing, and working for a consistent end and purpose, and therefore a true unity itself and able to express its unity through a material building, there is nothing here to show. In a word, *the house is mad*, and has no meaning. All other houses find their explanation in intelligent causation, not blind chance, or fate, or mere mechanical motion, but an end seen by personalities to be good and reasonable, and therefore the final CAUSE of all their building. It is strange that this simile, to which 'Buddhism' has so rashly committed itself, to prove that personality is an illusion, is the very one which has been employed by all genuine thinkers, from time immemorial, to illustrate the great metaphysical truth, that personality is indeed in the words of the Greatest Personality of History, "the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End."

Of this fact an unexpected confirmation has just come from Physics as Sir Oliver Lodge in a lecture on 'Radium and its meaning' has recently pointed out. 'Only a few atoms are unstable from instant to instant. Most behave as if they were permanent, but they are probably *none of them really and eternally permanent*. In old days Heraclitus taught that nothing is fixed or permanent. In human life the fact is easily recognised. All our efforts are towards the future. We are *working always for a future*, for the next improvement or *advance* that we see to be possible, for a state of things not yet realised but

attainable. And when it is attained we shall be *working* for something still further ahead; and so always. *Activity is the rule throughout.* Twenty years ago it was thought that the atoms of matter were exempt from change. The form or grouping of the visible material aggregates changed indeed, but as Maxwell said, the atoms themselves remained constant; they are the *foundation stones of the material universe*, and are perfect in size and number and weight, unchanged and unchangeable, not capable of wear, but as true today as when they were coined (cut) at the mint (in the workshop) of the mighty Artificer (or Architect of the universe), in some inconceivable dawn of creation. Not so; the process of change has been found to reach to these also. Nothing material is permanent. It is slowly *changing*, not merely the groupings, but *the foundation stones themselves.* The atoms are crumbling and decaying. Must they not also be *forming and coming to the birth?* The discovery may not come in our time, but science is rapidly growing, and it may. We are yearly coming nearer to some sort of comprehension of *the mind and method* infused into the material cosmos.

Again, in a still later article exposing the pretensions of the biologist Haeckel, after referring to the resolution of atoms into ether, the Physicist remarks that the category of life is still untouched. 'Is *life* a temporary trivial collocation associated with certain complex groupings of the atoms, and resolved into nothing when that grouping is interfered with? Or is it something *immaterial* and itself fundamental, something *which uses these collocations of matter in order to display itself* amid material surroundings, but is otherwise *essentially independent of them?* Though Haeckel would answer the question with a contemptuous negative, and his treatment of Life would also extend to mind and Religion, *I challenge him* to say by what right he gives that answer.'

If, on the other hand, Haeckel is not writing as a Scientist for other men of Science, who are able, in Lodge's words, to 'take a wider survey of existence and to perceive possibilities to which Haeckel's narrow and limited view is blind,' but writes as a professed philosopher himself, then metaphysicians in their turn will challenge him to explain the fundamental contradiction that underlies the 'double-faced unity' hypothesis, that not spirit or personality but x is the ultimate explanation of the world. If mind is the mere adjunct of material collocation, and not an agency which directs it and

controls, how can the two sides be on an equal footing with each other, as this kind of 'miserable and degraded monism' demands, seeing that one of the partners, *viz.*, consciousness, comes out of itself, and the 'unity,' and turns round and looks upon that 'unity,' itself and the other, in the face? If we try and realise what this absurd and inconceivable 'unity' means, consciousness at once gets the upper hand. Such cheap and easy 'monism' is in a state of unstable equilibrium and results in either an inconsistent Idealism as throughout Spinoza, or the Haeckelian's 'materialistic and degraded monism,' now 'belated and stranded' by the flood of contemporary thought.

Moreover, so far from its being true as the 'Buddhist' idly supposes, that it is "proved that consciousness can have no existence independent of the organism," the facts, of course, as I shall show in my second article when dealing with the experimental study of the mind, point to just the opposite conclusion. "We have not granted, writes Lodge, that mind is limited to its material manifestation. Mind may be incorporate in matter but it may also transcend it. Those who teach that monism signifies a *limitation* of mind to the potentialities of matter [as generally accepted], and that 'soul' signifies 'a sum of plasma-movements in the ganglion cells,' must be content with an audience of uneducated persons." And he goes on to show that while 'neither matter nor energy possesses a power of guidance or control,' and 'inorganic matter is impelled solely by pressure from behind, and is not influenced by the future' or *the idea of an end,* 'an organism animated by mind' is very different.

'*The essence of mind is design and purpose.* Must we not say that as we are conscious of the power of guidance in ourselves, so guidance and intelligent control may be an element running through the universe, and may be incorporated even in material things? A traveller coming across a path says 'This will guide me home.' Him Haeckel should consistently laugh to scorn, saying, "What guidance or purpose can there be in a material object? There is no guidance or purpose in the universe; things are because they cannot be otherwise, not because of any intention underlying them. How can a path, which is little better than the wearing down of stones, know where you live and guide you to any desired destination? Moreover, whatever knowledge or purpose the path exhibits must be *in the path,* must be a property of the atoms of

which it is composed. To them some fraction of will, of power, of knowledge and of feeling *may* perhaps be attributed, and from their *aggregation* something of the same kind may perhaps be deduced. But if the traveller conceives the path to have been made with any teleological object or intelligent purpose, he is abandoning himself to superstition and is as likely to be led by it to the edge of a precipice as to anywhere else." '

Haeckel's 'path' is like the 'house' of Mr. Lakshmi Narasu Naidu. And both the path and house are mad. But 'matter,' as all sane men, whose minds are not distorted by prejudices or pseudo-metaphysical 'thinking,' will agree with the Principal of the University of Birmingham, is the 'instrument and vehicle of mind. Incarnation is the mode by which it interacts with the present scheme of things and thereby the element of guidance is supplied; it can in fact be embodied in an intelligent arrangement of inert inorganic matter. Even a mountain path exhibits the property of *guidance*, and has *direction*: it is an incorporation of intelligence, though itself inert.' That the meaning of 'matter' is throughout mind-dependent, and is nothing but the medium through which Spirit or Personality works, has been well set forth in an appreciation of Dr. R. B. Haldane's "Pathway to Reality" in the *Edinburgh Review*: "The essence of matter and the true teaching of materialism is that matter is the *expression*, or the permanent possibility of the expression, of thought. An undeciphered inscription, is a permanent possibility of thought, though the key to the thought has been lost and has not yet been found by us; and so, too, is the material universe, even though it is yet but imperfectly interpreted to us. The strange thing is that the materialist, who is busy in attempting to decipher it by means of laws of Nature and the uniformity of Nature, and the law of universal causation, fills up his spare time by saying that of course *it has no meaning*, that *the stone or the material universe* alone exists, and that the thought of which it is the expression and which he is busy finding out, has no existence and no reality. Whereas *the thought of the thinker is prior to its expression*, on inscribed monuments, or in the hieroglyphics of Nature. The view which Mr. Haldane was expressing in his Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews was, almost at the same time, definitely formulated by one whose authority as a man of science will not be disputed, Lord Kelvin, in the words: 'It is not in dead matter that

we live and move and have our being, but in the creating and *directive power* which science compels us to accept as an article of belief. We only know God in His works, but we are absolutely forced by science to admit and believe with absolute confidence in a *directive power*, in an influence other than physical, dynamical, and electrical forces.'" Such a power is Personality or Spirit. For it is only such a union of power with purpose that satisfies our idea of *cause*. The ground or explanation of something which happens must be found in something which already exists. But still we ask the question, *why*? And we are not content till we know the *purpose* for which the something happened, as well as the *how*, or the means through which, and the efficient cause. Such a union of final and efficient causes is only found in spirit. It is only in Personality that an idea, a final cause, an end, can become an efficient cause, that power and purpose, beginning and end, mechanism and teleology can meet, and the *idea* which is found good pass into actuality. Personality is the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last. In Personality, then, and not in dead matter we live and move and have our being. 'In His knowledge *standeth* our Eternal Life,' even as the house or building stands completed in the Architect's plan or mind. For the analogy of building, as was said before, is the best illustration of the meaning of Personality as the only real *cause*. Personality is here seen to be the source of all 'things,' all 'phenomena,' and their arrangement into unity, as the house is the expression of the architect's design. 'An architect, says a modern writer, designs a building. His thought is creative: he thinks out all details in his mind until he has the complete and finished structure in his mind's eye. He then proceeds to draw plans on paper, his thought is uttered; it becomes words; his plans are the first utterance into visibility of his thought. In course of time, through processes involving labour and delay, his thought becomes bricks and mortar, and dwells among us, and the edifice is completed.

Now I ask where, and in what, does the reality of that building reside? You say, in the bricks and mortar—we can see it, touch it, dwell in it. No, emphatically no; the reality of that edifice is not in the bricks and mortar, it is in the mind of the architect. He has thought it as a complete whole. He cannot unthink it. Let it be burnt down, let it be burnt down a hundred times, so long as the

architect lives the true being of the building lives, irrevocably, perfectly in his mind.' It is of this 'City of the Living God' that Tennyson sings

> For there is nothing in it as it seems
> Saving the king; tho' some there be that hold
> The king a shadow, and the city real:
>
> . . . .
>
> For an ye heard a music, like enow
> They are building still, seeing the city is built
> To music, and not built in Space or Time,
> And therefore built for ever.

Personality is indeed the only real *cause*, and cannot itself be explained away in terms of building and reduced as our pseudo-Buddhist would reduce it to the level of a material or quasi-material thing; 'by so much as,' the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* puts it, '*He that built the house hath more honour than the House.*

But if after all, 'we look for a city which hath foundations,' and 'other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid,' which is the Archetype of Personality, the Alpha and the Omega, Foundation and Corner-stone in one (Personality is here not only the final and the efficient, and the formal, but the material, *cause* as well), 'a city whose Builder and Maker is God'; and if, in very truth, 'we are God's Building,' 'foreordained to be conformed to the image' which is in the mind and plan of the Great Architect of the world; are we not ourselves reducing Personality to thinghood, and employing a metaphor which robs man of his activity and freedom and denies that he is the true cause of his life and actions as certainly as the simile of the potter and the clay?

It is true that man is only now winning Personality and earning and working out his freedom. 'My father worketh hitherto, and I work.' But we also are in some sense 'God's fellow-workers.' Men indeed are means to God and to one another, but never means only, but always and at the same time ends in themselves.

"Builder and Maker, Thou, of Houses not made with hands.' Stones indeed we are, but *living*, and *conscious*, and *free* stones, as the stones of a material house are not. God is not *external* to us, as the house is external to a human builder. In the City of God, the relation of spirit to spirit is one between free persons and must be teleogically and not mechanically conceived. 'Our voluntary service he requires, not our necessitated.' We are ourselves builders, but the house is not. The house is a thing, a means only; persons may be means, but they are also ends in themselves.

But with the 'Buddhist,' 'the House hath more honour than the Builder.' He ignores the fact that 'every house is builded indeed *by some one*,' still more the fact that 'He that built all things is God.' Instead of explaining the house in terms of Personality, he seeks to explain away Conation, Activity, Unity, Self, End, which are only aspects of Spirit, of Personality, by reducing them to the level of a building the fact of whose origin and existence he is unable, or unwilling, to explain.

In the next sentence he tells us: 'Just as a house is the *combination* of all its *parts*, so the personality is that *peculiar interaction* which originates by a *combination* of sensory and motor *organs*, perceptions, emotions, ideas, and *volitions* (sic).' There are at least seven different blunders in this specimen of 'Buddhist' 'thinking' which I shall proceed to enumerate and remark on one by one.

1. There is no basis for analogy between a material house in space, and Personality which is not in space, but is the cause of space, and which is immaterial; between a thing which is only a means or end for Personality, and Personality which is an end-in-itself.

2. The term *part* is illegitimate, for there is no true unity or whole to which the term refers.

3. Personality is said to be *peculiar*. Peculiar is 'very good,' 'a very good phrase,' as Mr. Justice Shallow would have said. But why 'peculiar'? Is it meant that Personality differs from all other cases of interaction, which are not peculiar, and can be easily explained? It is of course untrue to say that *any* interaction is really 'explained,' at any rate by mechanical science, at all. But the insinuation obviously is that consciousness can be accounted for as the result of molecular, and other processes equally mechanical, in 'sensory and motor organs,' except that while these are only movements in space and certain phosphates are secreted during brain-work, there is *produced* or is secreted in addition to these 'phenomena,' certain 'epiphenomena' which are *peculiar*, because they are not in space; just as I suppose it would be *peculiar*, if the stomach, which has not yet done it, took to secreting a consciousness of its own, as well as the gastric juice, or the liver in addition to producing bile, began to *produce* a *personality* very much in the same way as these 'thinkers' maintain that sensation is a 'productive function of the brain.'

Before dismissing the great physiologist's argument as a 'subterfuge' bolstering up 'the falling edifice of immortality' (a 'falling edifice' is an unfortunate metaphor for one who appears to argue that *houses can make themselves,* for his own 'house' seeing that there was no one there to build it or to do the necessary repairs, has long ago tumbled about his ears), *let the pseudo-Buddhist show wherein the fallacy or subterfuge consists,* and how he can reply to the charge of confusion of thought and logic of which William James convicts all who draw a *materialistic* conclusion from the facts of cerebral physiology.

4. Personality is not an *interaction* at all. The writer of course is using the term, as so many others, with the vaguest conception of its meaning. Is it meant that it is comparable to the action of two cogwheels, *e. g.*, upon each other in space? The 'Buddhist,' though not the English meaning of the term, would seem to be that it is 'the *result* of an interaction,' which is mechanical, between certain factors called 'sensory and motor organs,' etc. But to attempt to reduce mind to Physics today is an absurdity. The Associationists have tried it and failed. All mechanism implies teleology, and it is in this latter aspect of design and purpose, that the meaning of mind and personality consists.

5. 'A combination of sensory and motor organs.' As these words are immediately followed 'by perceptions, emotions,' etc., it is at first doubtful, such is the highly metaphorical style of writing, whether he is not mixing up the mind and the brain, and whether he is speaking of the physical and physiological facts of the nervous system, or not. 'Things,' 'part,' 'organism,' 'aggregate' ('an *organism* of many *aggregates*'), 'personality,' 'self,' 'individual,' ('denial of a *self* does not obliterate the *personality* of a *man*, but liberates the *individual* from an error liable to stunt *his* development, and *his* attainment of perfection), are terms used with such a contempt for Logic, and with such an absence of any particular meaning, (and why not? since all *meaning*, and the *source of meaning*, are excluded by this 'sturdy minded physicist' from his purely mechanical world) that it is quite possible the term 'organ' may be used in a similar way. But giving the 'Buddhist' the benefit of the doubt, and confining ourselves to the expression 'combination of sensory and motor organs,' it is interesting to compare this 'Buddhistic' account, as a correct description of the facts

of modern cerebral physiology, with the very different conclusions at which Professor William James, speaking with the authority of an expert on the physiology of the nervous system has arrived.

'The structural unit of the nervous system is a triad neither of whose elements has any independent existence............The willing department of our nature *dominates* both the conceiving and the feeling departments. [This is the] great contribution physiology has made to psychology of late years.'

'Accordingly, it is with no small pleasure that as a student of Physiology and Psychology, I find the only lesson I can learn from these sciences to be one that corroborates these [Theistic] convictions. From its first dawn, to its highest actual attainment we find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears to exist at all, appears but as *one element in an organic mental whole*, and as a minister to higher mental powers,—the powers of WILL. Such a thing as its emancipation and absolution from these *organic relations* receives no faintest color of plausibility from any fact we can discern.'

6. 'Combination of sensory and motor organs, perceptions, emotions,' etc. It is interesting here to note the delightful collocation. Are we to understand that the combination of the 'sensory and motor organs' in space is of a like nature with the combination of 'organs' in space with 'perceptions' not in space? Or is the combination of 'organs' in space with 'perceptions' not in space, the same in kind as the combination of 'perceptions' and emotions' not in space? Or is the combination of 'perceptions and emotions' not in space, like the combination of 'sensory and motor organs,' which are in space? The fact is the writer uses the expression 'combination' without any definite meaning at all. Anyhow, the whole business of 'combination' is useless. The 'elements' physiological or psychological, are never found loose to be combined. They were never separate to begin with. At one leap we pass from Psychology to Physics and mechanical interaction. The work of Darwin and Wallace, the Science of Biology, the ideas of evolution and development are ignored, and not even recognised to hold good of the brain, let alone of the Personality which through that organ finds expression.

7. 'Emotions, ideas, and *volitions*'. The inclusion of the term 'volitions' at the tail of the list is excellent, and suggests many heart-burnings on the writer's part before he finally agreed to let it stand, trusting that perhaps no one would notice it after all. He puts in 'volitions,' *because he has to*, and because it would be conspicuous by its absence. But in the light of the rest of his remarks on Personality, and I have confined myself to only the first page of his 'lucubrations,' (and there are nine more pages of similar sorry stuff, some of which I shall notice on another occasion), can

we consistently attach any meaning to the word? 'What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba? 'Volition' is used in a *peculiar* and 'Buddhistic' sense. How can one who denies Personality, who ignores the factors of Conation, Activity, Unity, Self, End, who ridicules that Idealism which from Berkeley downwards, teaches that Spirit, activity for a freely chosen ideal, is the only CAUSE there is, whether in the lifting of my little finger, or the evolution of a world, attach any intelligible meaning to the term 'volition'? For our pseudo-Buddhist, Spirit, Causal activity, Free will, is delusion. Personality is but the outcome of the shifting of a number of mechanical units, if even units they can be .

But for me God is complete Personality, the cause of causes. But that Ethical, not Physical, Unity (a Unity of common purpose, Perfect Unanimity), seeing that God is Love, implies the 'presence within itself of many individual finite centres, of persons, whose freedom is not incompatible with their relation to each other and to the whole.'

I said above that there was no analogy between a material House or Building and a Person; but there is, if we recollect that the stones meant are not dead stones, but *living* and not only living but *conscious*, building themselves with ever-growing power of insight into the Great Architect's Design. The whole must be for the parts, its members, as the parts or members for the whole. It is this recognition of active, independent persons, *Free-men, Free-stones*, wrought and cemented into true unity only through the idea of some common good or *purpose*, which seems to differentiate the ideals of the East and West. Not a dead and impersonal Unity, not a Tyranny of the One, that entails a sacrifice of the freedom and character of the individual lives, but a *Living Unity* of heart and purpose, a Unity of Persons, who are only their true selves in co-operating with one another, a society of *Perfect Unanimity*, this is the ideal of the philosophy of the modern man.

Like that great Scotsman, missionary and pioneer of civilisation in Darkest Africa, whose life was devoted to the furtherance of the brotherhood of man, through whose labours millions can call themselves *Free* men to-day, one of those builders of Empire whose work endures, each one of us may be a *Living-stone* growing more and more into that pattern which is in accordance with the Great Architect's Design, and communicating life and freedom to the dead material around, until we begin to see the outlines of a Building,

fairer far even than that miracle of marble, which, they say, whoever sees, never wishes to be other than it is, and which H. E. Lord Ampthill once aptly instanced as being, in its perfect symmetry and beauty, the type and model of the *purpose* of all those who are working for the good of India, and through India, of the whole world.

And I saw the Holy City, New Jerusalem, coming down from out of heaven, from God...............And the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be therein: and His servants shall do Him service; and they shall see His face.

ERCAD, SALEM. ERIC DREW.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

A PRIMER OF TAMIL LITERATURE:—By M. S. Purnalingam Pillai, B. A. (Ananda Press, Madras. Price Re. 1.)

Tamil occupies a very unique position among the languages of Southern India in that it has a vast literature of hoary antiquity extending over a period of more than two thousand years. No other language of Southern India, or for the matter of that, of the whole peninsula of India can stand comparison with it, with the solitary exception of Sanskrit. Malayalam, Telugu and Canarese are still in their infantile stage of development and their literature is but scanty. It is a matter for congratulation that some of the earliest works in Tamil were the productions of Malabar men. Ilanko-Adigal, the author of a classical work in Tamil, called *Chilappathikaram* was one of the princes of Chera. This gifted bard probably lived before the beginning of the Christian era at Cranganore or Thiruvanchikolam. He has shed a halo of glory on Tamil literature and his immortal poem is still read with avidity by Tamil scholars and savants. Kulasekhara Perumal, also born in the purple, abdicated his throne and turned a *Vira* Vaishnava or Vaishnava fanatic. He has enriched Tamil literature by his *Mukundamalai*, a poem in one hundred and five stanzas. Malabar, therefore, has contributed not a little to the greatness of Tamil literature.

It is uphill work writing a history of Tamil literature. The materials are not always accessible, and even if they are, they are not always reliable. A writer of a history of Tamil literature has to labour under the disadvantage of having to separate an ounce of fact from a mountain of fiction,—has to evolve out of a chaos of legends a connected narrative of the principal events in their orderly sequence. Indian chronology can seldom be depended upon unless there are incontrovertible proofs to sustain the position which an author takes up. These are some of the difficulties which an historian of Tamil literature has to contend with. We have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Purnalingam Pillai has succeeded in producing a very readable book and has paved the way for a larger work on the history of Tamil literature. The book under notice gives a clear and succinct account of Tamil literature, and we are happy to be able to congratulate the author on the admirable manner in which he has acquitted himself of a difficult task. We beg, however, to point out that his sneers at the Aryans and their civilisation are out of place. The Tamils owe a good deal to the Aryans, and Aryan literature has had, on the whole, a beneficial influence on Tamil literature. We are far from contending that this influence has been an unmixed blessing. There is a soul of evil in things good as there is a soul of good in things evil. Surely it is time for us to cease quarrelling over petty differences, to live in peace and amity, and to promote the best interests of our fatherland.

Other reviews are held over for want of space.

This number contains 20 extra pages.